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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the commemoration of Indian soldiers who died during the First
World War by the Imperial War Graves Commission, Britain’s official government body
overseeing all imperial commemoration efforts. For the soldiers of the Indian Army their war
experience was split between the Western Front in Europe and Mesopotamia in modern-day Iraq.
They were also far more ethnically, religiously, and lingually diverse than their British and
Dominion counterparts. In order to examine how geography, religion, and the imperial
relationship affected Britain’s commemoration of India’s war dead, this study uses the
Commission’s own records to recreate how the IWGC created its policies regarding Indian
soldiers. The result shows that while the Commission made nearly every effort to respect India’s
war dead, the complexity of their backgrounds hampered these efforts and forced compromises
to be made. The geography of the war also forced a clear definition between the memories of
Indian soldiers who died in Europe and those who fell in Mesopotamia.
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INTRODUCTION

“We pray God that some opportunity be given us that we may be able to use our sharp and
glittering swords for the destruction of the Germans, and place our names on the tongues of the
entire world.” - Mahomed Usuf Khan, Meerut Cavalry Brigade, France, 1916. 1

On 23 October 1914, the soldiers of the 3rd Lahore Division, I Indian Corps, British
Expeditionary Force, reinforced a British defensive line near the towns of La Bassee and Neuve
Chapelle, France. By the end of the Battle of La Bassee ten days later over 1,500 Indian soldiers
had been killed or wounded along with 15,000 other casualties from British and Commonwealth
units. 2 Traveling thousands of miles to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, the Indian and
British soldiers of the Indian Army found themselves involved in the deadliest war in European
history to that point; 60,000 of these men did not survive the war. 3 For the men who died far
from home without family or community to care for their remains, the Imperial War Graves
Commission, the British government body responsible for graves registration and the building of
monuments to the Empire’s war dead, became responsible for their burial and memorialization.
The cemeteries and memorials built by the Commission following the war act as the enduring
legacy of these soldier’s service and sacrifice.
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David Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers Letters, 1914-18 (MacMillan, London,
1999), 182.
2
J. E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1914: Antwerp, La Bassée,
Armentières, Messines and Ypres October–November 1914 (London: Macmillan,1925), 205-224
3
Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 4.
1

Death has always been a central part of almost all works written about the First World
War. The scale of this loss is not only significant on its own, but has also had far reaching social
and political consequences. The memory of this death and the soldiers who were lost during the
war has also been the subject of a growing historiographic discourse. Scholars recognize Paul
Fussell’s 1975 work The Great War and Modern Memory as the foundational work on the
memory of World War I. While his analysis focuses on the influence of literature on the
formation of memory, it also introduces several dynamics which continue to influence
examinations of memory and the memorialization of the Great War. The most influential
argument made by Fussell is that instead of World War I leading to a demythologized world,
“the movement was towards myth, towards a revival of the cultic, the mythical, the sacrificial,
the prophetic, the sacramental, and the universally significant.” 4 In his 1990 work Fallen
Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars George L. Mosse expands upon Fussell’s
argument for myth and examines what he calls the “Myth of War Experience.” This myth was
constructed both privately by the veterans themselves as well as publicly by government
agencies such as national burial commissions. This myth was based on the glory of war and
transformed the war experience into something that was meaningful and sacred. 5 In this way the
memory of the past is reshaped into a form which fits into the context of the present. Though
both of these works see myth as central to Great War memory, both also fail to examine the
effect of this on colonial soldiers and confine their analysis to Britain.

4

Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 142.
George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 6-7.
5

2

Mosse’s argument is not universally accepted, however, and Adrian Gregory offers an
alternative in The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946. In this work Gregory argues
that the memory of the war was constantly changing and shaped by the events of the inter-war
period. 6 Looking to contrast war commemoration in Britain from the other nations which fought
the war, Gregory argues that the most important shaper of memory is language. Ritual, tropes,
and rhetoric shaped a public discourse which defined the memory of the war. This public
discourse overshadowed the personal memories of those who lived through the war which were
shared privately. 7 Language is also central to Memory, Masculinity and National Identity in
British Visual Culture, 1914-1930: A Study of Unconquerable Manhood by Gabriel Koureas.
Koureas argues that collective memory and masculinity both have contested meanings and that
examining war memorials allows for an understanding of the power relations which existed
within male society in inter-war Britain. He also challenges assertions that war memory was an
almost universal construction. Where Gregory argues for the dominant role of language in the
construction of collective memory, Koureas states that this very language is an aesthetic of the
upper and middle classes. This is the language of memorials, speeches, and commemoration.
These very things not only bring about closure, but work to impose a new and more ordered
perception of war over the reality of chaos and loss. 8 Indian, South African, or other colonial
soldiers are absent from these works and their memory and language is ignored.
While the works above all examine the memory of World War I, and many the memory
of the dead, few actually engage with the role cemeteries and memorials played in this memory.

6

Adrian Gregory, The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946 (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 5.
Ibid., 5-7.
8
Gabriel Koureas, Memory, Masculinity and National Identity in British Visual Culture, 19141930: A Study of Unconquerable Manhood (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 2-3.
7
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One of the works which does focus on these sites is Bart Ziino’s 2007 book A Distant Grief:
Australians, War Graves and the Great War. In examining the role of the Imperial War Graves
Commission in constructing these sites of grieving, Ziino states that it “produced a testament of
care in the cemeteries [it] created, if not the testament to Empire its founders also envisaged.” 9
Jay Winter’s Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning also examines the process of grief following the
war. In his examination of war graves and memorials Winter is more concerned with the
aesthetic qualities and these sites rather than their influence on memory. Cemeteries are
described as the “repository of remarkable commemorative art” and the colonies are only
mentioned in reference to the previous architectural work of Sir Edwin Lutyens in New Delhi. 10
Both the Imperial War Graves Commission and the Indian Army are mentioned once and only in
passing. Ignoring any actual analysis of their place in the grieving process, Winter simply uses
colonial issues as footnotes to a larger argument.
There are few works that directly examine the Commission and those that do are often
meant for general audiences. Works such as David Crane’s Empires of the Dead: How One
Man’s Vision Led to the Creation of WWI’s War Graves and British and Commonwealth War
Cemeteries by Julie Summers were published as general histories of the Commission and offer
little in the way of theory. Works which do offer more extensive analysis such as Philip
Longworth’s The Unending Vigil: The History of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission
are wide ranging histories which cover the entire history of the Commission through both world
wars. Memory theory and analysis is largely absent from these works. They also lack almost any

9

Bart Ziino, A Distant Grief: Australians, War Graves and the Great War (Crawley: University
of Western Australia Press, 2007), 190.
10
Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural Memory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 78-116.
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examination of the treatment of colonial soldiers and the effect of their burial and
commemoration on their memory. While simple explanations of colonial monuments or burials
are mentioned, they are rarely longer than a page in length and lack any real analysis.
When historians examine the colonial memory of World War I directly it is most often in
articles on very specific subjects. Bill Nasson has examined the South African National War
Memorial and the ways in which it excludes black African support soldiers, is largely
Christianized, and ultimately became overshadowed by the legacy of Apartheid. 11 Peter Stanley
also examines colonial memory in Die in Battle, Do not Despair: The Indians on Gallipoli, 1915.
Largely remembered as part of the ANZAC legacy, Stanley explains the limited memory of
Indian participation at Gallipoli through memorials and burial practices. Although over 60,000
members of the Indian Army died in nearly every theater of the war, their graves are largely
absent from the official and unofficial cemeteries found at nearly every battlefield. Stanley
explains this by noting that the graves of Muslim soldiers would have been left undisturbed and
that those of Hindus and Sikhs would have been exhumed, cremated, and their ashes spread in
appropriate areas. Memorials to Indians who served at Gallipoli are also largely non-existent
except for one erected in Patiala. Because “[m]emorials and cemeteries now dictate much of how
visitors understand the campaign,” the memory of Indian soldiers at Gallipoli has suffered. 12
Although Great War memory is the subject of a growing historiographic debate, the role
of Indian soldiers in this memory has been largely ignored. Even fewer historians have examined
British commemoration of India’s dead and missing soldiers of the First World War. This is

11

Bill Nasson, “Delville Wood and South African Great War Commemoration,” The English
Historical Review 119, no. 480 (Feb. 2004): 57-86.
12
Peter Stanley, Die in Battle, Do not Despair: The Indians on Gallipoli, 1915 (Birmingham:
Helion and Company, 2015), 283-302.
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surprising as the theory and models used in many of the works above lend themselves well to an
analysis of Indian soldiers and their commemoration. The government memorialization
examined by Mosse, the inter-war formation of memory argued for by Gregory, the importance
of language noted by Koureas, and the influence of religious burial rites on the inclusion of
soldiers in cemeteries are all highly relevant to any analysis of the IWGC’s memorialization of
Indian soldiers. The goal of this thesis is to combine these methods in order to fill a
historiographic gap that leaves the commemoration of India's war dead, specifically its missing
soldiers, by the British government unexamined.
When the First World War began in July of 1914, the countries involved did not yet
realize the massive scale it would take on. As it progressed, however, it became clear that the
Great War would take place on a scale unseen before in Europe. As the war escalated, it began to
push the manpower reserves of the belligerents to the breaking point. In order to help fill the
ranks of their armies, the great nations of Europe looked to their colonial empires. For the British
this meant drawing soldiers from across the world including from India, where the Indian Army
could draw upon hundreds of thousands of young men ready for service in Europe. 13 Originally
under the control of the British East India Company, the British army in India transferred to the
control of the British government after the Rebellion of 1857. Made up of a mix of British and
Indian soldiers, by 1879 the army numbered almost 200,000 men. 14 Intended to ensure civil
order within India itself and to protect the frontier from Russian and Ottoman attack, the British
government used the Indian Army in limited numbers outside of India prior to World War I.

13

Dewitt C. Ellinwood and S. D. Pradhan, eds. India and World War 1 (Columbia, Mon.: South
Asia Books, 1978), 12.
14
Pradeep P. Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-1949
(Westport: Praeger, 2003), 2-3
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During the nineteenth century, the British government deemed its soldiers unnecessary, or
perhaps unwanted, in both the Boer War and the Crimean War. 15 The sheer scale and lethality of
the First World War changed this overnight. The stagnant nature of trench warfare and the
extensive use of new technologies such as modern artillery and machine guns resulted in soldiers
being killed and wounded at an astonishing rate. On the first day of the Battle of the Somme
alone the British army suffered almost 60,000 wounded and 20,000 killed. 16 An all-volunteer
force recruiting nearly 20,000 men every year, mostly from North Western India, the Indian
Army provided Britain with manpower it desperately needed. With a strength of 155,000 when
war broke out in Europe in 1914, over 1.27 million men served in the Indian Army by the end of
the war. 17
The 60,000 soldiers of the Indian Army who died during the war made up only part of the
nearly one million soldiers from across the British Empire who gave their lives during the war.
In total, over nine million soldiers from all sides died during the four-year conflict. 18 Millions
more civilians shared their fate. 19 Death on this scale not only changed the demographics of
Europe, but the very way that it viewed death and commemorated those who died. Bart Ziino,
when discussing the Australian war experience, describes the war as “a crucial moment in
western cultures of death and mourning” that “did not simply create new ways of mourning or
induce rejection of older forms. Rather, it induced more focused attempts to conduct familiar
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Ellinwood and Pradhan, India and World War 1, 5.
G. J. Meyer, A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918 (New York: Delta,
2006), 447.
17
Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 1-4.
18
Meyer, A World Undone, 7.
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Ibid., 705.
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forms of mourning despite unfamiliar forms of death.” 20 Due to the scale of death produced by
the war, the British government made the decision not to repatriate the bodies of fallen soldiers.
Instead, the British government buried or memorialized these soldiers near where they fell, never
to return home to their families. For the British Empire’s war dead, the ground they fought and
died for became their eternal resting place allowing for a new form of memorialization not seen
before in war.
Although British dead did not return home, they remained forever at rest in the
cemeteries and memorials built by the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) following the
war. In the years after the war, the IWGC constructed over 1,850 cemeteries and memorials that
contain the remains or names of over one million soldiers who died during the conflict. The
memorial at the Menin Gate in Belgium alone memorializes over 55,000 soldiers from across
Britain’s Empire. 21 For the Indian soldiers who died during the war, the memorials at Menin
Gate in Belgium, Neuve Chapelle in France, and Basra in modern day Iraq, stand as the primary
memorials to their service during the war. The IWGC’s cemeteries and memorials act not only as
testaments to the lives of individual soldiers and as places of mourning for their families, but
stand as places of grief and bereavement for entire nations. 22 The crosses that mark their graves
and the memorials that list their names stand as the most visible reminders of not only the death
caused by the war, but of the war itself. In this way, these memorials have played a central role
in forming both individual and collective memory of the war.
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Ziino, A Distant Grief, 2.
Ibid., 2-3.
22
Ibid., 5.
21
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The actions of the IWGC following the war, and over the years since, have constructed
and shaped a large part of the British public’s, and even the world’s, collective memory of World
War I and the soldiers of the British Empire who served and died. The creation of memory is not
a one-time event, but rather a process that is never truly complete. While individuals who lived
through the war created their own personal memories of that period, these same memories could
not help but be influenced by society. Lynn Abrams explains this dynamic by stating that
“individual memories are recalled using the language and frameworks deemed acceptable or
understandable in society or within the group with which the individual identifies.” 23 The
memories of individuals are “reformed” to better fit into a larger “grand narrative.” This process
of transformation is known as “social memory” and sees memories as “particularly relevant
when they are articulated; shared memories, indeed the sharing process itself, that is to say the
production of spoken or written narratives about the past, will take form within the framework of
the meaning given them by the group inside which they are told.” 24 The concept that individuals
and organizations share the memories most important to them is central to this dynamic. This
process of sharing then creates a collective memory that is an amalgamation of the most
important memories of society. Because we have now entered a period when those who lived
through the Great War have all passed away, it is only historical memory that remains. Historical
memory is a “learned historical experience” for those generations who live after an event or
period has occurred. 25 The cemeteries and memorials built by the IWGC now act as physical
representations of the men who served and died during the Great War.

23

Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (New York: Routledge, 2010), 96.
James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), 88.
25
Abrams, Oral History Theory, 100-101.
24
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Geography also played a crucial element in shaping the memory of India’s war dead.
Many Indians viewed the war as a distant event with little impact on their daily lives. 26 While the
families whose loved ones served abroad most certainly felt a stronger connection to the war
than the general public, geography still influenced this connection. Rather than being recruited
from areas across India, the vast majority of Indians who served in the army came from the
North Western areas of the country including Punjab, North-West Frontier, and Uttar Pradesh.
The British conception of martial races that believed those Indians living in the North West were
capable soldiers, and those from the south and east as being effete, was directly responsible for
this geographic division in recruitment. 27 This geographic division meant that while most Indians
already felt distanced from the war, those who lived in the North West experienced a stronger
connection to the war through their family members who served.
But where Indian soldiers died also produced a critical influence on how the British
government memorialized and remembered them. The IWGC reluctantly made a postwar
decision to make a critical distinction between memorials to Indian soldiers erected within
Europe and those located in other theaters of the war. Central to this distinction is the difference
between meticulous graves registration and record-keeping efforts in Europe and the haphazard
character they took on in Mesopotamia. Since these memorials contained the inscriptions of all
missing soldier’s names as a central element of their design, poorly kept records in Mesopotamia
made it nearly impossible to accurately list the names of all missing Indians. Working against
fast-approaching deadlines and with little time to correct the lists of the dead, the IWGC decided
to simply list most Indian dead as part of a statistic. Panels on memorials commemorating Indian

26
27

Ellinwood and Pradhan, India and World War I, 1-18.
Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 2.
10

units therefore only give a number for how many Indian enlisted died or went missing during the
war, while all others are listed by name. Because of this, nearly every single Indian soldier who
died in Europe has his name engraved in stone alongside his British counterparts. For those who
died elsewhere, except for Indian officers and NCOs, they are listed as part of a simple number,
reduced to a statistic, their individual experiences and sacrifices erased from the memory of the
war. 28
What cannot be forgotten is that this memorialization process happened within the
context of the British Empire. India did not enter the First World War for self-defense or selfinterest, but did so in response to the wartime needs of its metropole. 29 Britain’s need for
manpower increased as the war progressed, and it sent units from across the Empire to every
theater of the war in response. The largest combined effort the Empire had seen, World War I
proved to many the strength and unity of the British Empire. 30 Many historians, including Ziino,
have pointed out how the IWGC, and its director Sir Fabian Ware, sought to build memorials not
only to the Empire’s war dead, but also to the Empire itself. 31 This effort to memorialize the
Empire then turned the personal tragedy of a soldier’s death into a national one. Mosse adds to
this argument by stating that the war precipitated “‘a new stage in the history of nationalism’ in
which the state ‘nationalised the dead’ through the creation of mass and uniform cemeteries.” 32
This nationalization makes it important to examine how the British government chose to

28

Lt. Col. Lord Arthur Browne, Letter to Under Secretary of State India Office, 14 March 1924.
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memorialize the Empire’s war dead. Soldiers from places in the Empire such as Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand could be commemorated in much the same way as British soldiers,
that is as white Christians. India’s war dead posed a unique challenge though. Non-white and
belonging to multiple religions, predominantly Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism, these 60,000 dead
provide an opportunity to examine how the IWGC viewed India’s war contributions, its place
within the Empire, and the recognition its war dead deserved compared to those of Britain and its
Dominions. The accommodations it made in order to respect Indian soldiers’ religion, language,
burial rites, and accomplishments will be at the heart of this analysis.
In order to examine how geography, religion, and the imperial relationship affected
Britain’s commemoration of India’s war dead, I chose to examine how the IWGC created its
policies regarding Indian soldiers. In order to accomplish this, I visited the now Commonwealth
War Graves Commission archive located at its headquarters in Maidenhead, United Kingdom.
Relevant folders were selected from the archives index and were provided by an archivist upon
request. These folders cover a wide range of topics including “Indian Graves in Gallipoli and
Asia Minor,” “Memorials to the Missing: Mesopotamia Part 1 & 2,” “Indian Graves: France and
Belgium,” and even “Correspondence: Lord Hugh Cecil and Lt. Col. Sir F. Kenyon.” These
folders cover chronologies ranging from less than a year to over ten years in some instances. The
documents in these folders are organized in reverse chronological order as new documents were
added on top of existing ones. Relevant documents from each folder, numbering over 1,000
pages, were then digitally photographed and indexed by folder with a short description of each
document. These documents are mostly made up of personal correspondence, memoranda,
official reports, and news clippings. The most common documents by far are the personal
correspondence between high level members of the Commission. These documents allowed for
12

the Commission’s internal discussions on policy creation and memorial planning over time to be
reconstructed. The result is a detailed look at how the IWGC approached the intricacies of Indian
religions and burial rites, the complex efforts to create respectful yet practical policies
concerning India’s war dead, and the eventual effect these decisions had on the memory of these
fallen soldiers. While conducting my research the archivists at the Commission archives were
incredibly helpful and enthusiastic about supporting my research efforts.

13

CONFLICT, EMPIRE, AND THE TURN IN BRITISH WAR
MEMORIALIZATION

“Tell my mother not to go wandering madly because her son, my brother, is dead. To be
born and to die is God’s order. Someday we must die, sooner or later, and if I die here, who will
remember me? It is a fine thing to die far from home. A saint said this, and, as he was a good
man, it must be true.” - A wounded Sikh to his father, January 1915. 33

Death has always been a defining factor of war as well as its enduring legacy. From the
earliest conflicts, society has sought to make sense of death in war, to give it meaning beyond the
spoils of victory. For centuries, this process remained a private one where families or small
communities mourned the loss of their loved ones. While the deaths of individual soldiers were
private tragedies, the credit for victories belonged to the upper classes that lead the army and
benefited most from its success. The process of memorializing these conflicts often excluded the
common soldier, their names remembered only by their fellow soldiers, their family and friends,
and written down in any documents that may have recorded their sacrifice. Only recently did the
idea of building monuments to the common soldiers who die during war, or even simply listing
their names, become a common practice. Often buried in mass graves following battles, common
soldiers received no lasting monument, no individual graves, and no place in the memory of war.
This emphasis on the upper-classes alone gradually began to change and the rise of
nationalism in Europe created a profound change in the way society viewed the accomplishments
of their fellow citizens. Seeing themselves as part of a national community, these citizens felt a
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David Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers' Letters, 1914-18 (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1999), 30.
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shared responsibility for the success and security of the nation as a whole. This new, shared
identity also transformed the triumphs and tragedies of individuals into those of the entire nation.
For this reason, war memorials became as much about re-enforcing patriotism and the imagined
community of nation, or in Britain’s case Empire, as they are about commemorating war dead. 34
Tombs of Unknown Soldiers and Cenotaphs are often the most visible representations of this
dynamic. Rather than memorializing the death of individuals, they represent the willingness of
the ideal citizen to sacrifice his life for the nation. 35 The massive wars of the Twentieth Century
reinforced this ideal and brought about a new willingness of citizens to die for their country, an
act often seen as the “ultimate sacrifice.” 36
Understanding how Britain changed the way it memorialized its war dead over time is
essential to understanding how the First World War influenced views of war, death, and Empire.
British wars prior to World War I were not truly imperial efforts and produced little impact on
imperial unity and identity. These wars also did not produce the magnitude of death necessary to
prompt a mass memorialization effort led by the British government. The First World War,
however, represented a massive war effort by every corner of Britain’s empire resulting in the
deaths of nearly one million soldiers. This presented the Imperial War Graves Commission and
the British Government with an opportunity to build a monument to the Empire itself. It would
also be its last chance. Although the Commission built cemeteries and monuments to the
Empire’s dead of the Second World War, the decolonization of the British Empire that soon

34

Andrew Lambert, “‘The Glory of England’: Nelson, Trafalgar and the Meaning of Victory,”
The Great Circle 28, no. 1 (2006): 3-12.
35
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followed ended these efforts for future wars. The experiences of the Second World War
furthered the formation of unique national identities for Britain’s Dominions. For India, the
growing influence of independence movements at home eventually lead to Partition and
Independence a few years after the end of the Second World War.
Until these World Wars, however, British war memorialization remained a private effort
independent of the government and focused primarily on the nation’s military leaders. Statues
that depicted great men who led their armies to victory remained the most prominent form of war
memorial throughout British history. Whether standing or mounted on horseback, these artifacts
act as symbols of the victories these men won. The most famous of these monuments in Britain,
the statue of Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson, posthumous victor of the Battle of Trafalgar, sits
perched high above the square that bears that battle’s name. At the base of his column, guarded
by four iconic British lions, are four bronze reliefs showing the great victories of Nelson’s life.
The battles of Cape St. Vincent, the Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar cost the British navy over
4,000 dead and wounded with 458 of these sailors dying at Trafalgar alone. Absent from the
column are the names of the other ranks, the common enlisted men, the monument reserved only
for the great man and his victories at sea. 37 Countless other statues of kings, generals, and
admirals dot the landscape of Britain’s cities, men who won their victories through the sacrifices
of the common soldiers and sailors who served under them.
Even if these leaders held great respect for their men, they did not plan and build the
monuments to the wars they fought. Nelson’s death at Trafalgar kept him from providing any
comment on the form of his memorial. Instead, this monument was planned and built in the

37

“Adm H Nelson - Nelsons Column,” Imperial War Museums, Accessed 25 July 2017,
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standard British form. Sponsored by a large group of peers and politicians, designed by
participants in a contest, and funded through public subscription, this statue serves as a collective
expression of British naval power. Nelson’s Column therefore represents how memorials
increasingly began to show those they honored as symbols of their nation’s exceptionalism.
Nearly any man who advanced his nation’s prestige and power became worthy of being
memorialized.
In Britain during the nineteenth century, the building of monuments represented the
growing fortunes of a nation spearheading the industrial revolution at home and rapidly
expanding the world’s largest empire abroad. In the dearth of European wars that occurred
during the period known as the Pax Britannica, Britain looked for new heroes to memorialize. It
found them in the numerous scientists and inventors that helped to start the industrial revolution
and put Britain at the forefront of scientific and economic achievement. Britain commemorated
men such as Isambard Kingdom Brunel, James Watt, Robert Stephenson, and Richard Arkwright
across the nation with statues, plaques, engravings, and other honorifics. While it did grant
knighthoods and other honors to these men, the British government made little, if any, effort to
build the physical memorials to their accomplishments. Instead, private efforts sponsored by
professional associations and local governments, and funded almost exclusively through public
subscriptions, created these memorials. The technological and economic advancements the men
these monuments commemorate created just as much, if not more, of an influence on Britain’s
fortunes than any military victory. Individually, they stood as icons of personal achievement,

17

taken as whole they showed the scientific and economic triumph of the British nation and
Empire. 38
While Britain emphasized peaceful, scientific pursuits, during this period, it still waged
some wars; however, and Britain sent her armies abroad in both the Crimean War in 1853 and
the Second Boer War in 1899. In one of these wars, Britain joined an allied effort to halt Russian
expansion into Crimea and the Balkans, while in the other it fought a war against imperial rivals
in South Africa. The first major war for Britain in almost forty years, and costing nearly 20,000
lives, it is not surprising that a monument to the victory over Russia in Crimea was erected in the
middle of London. 39 Located in St. James and designed by John Bell, construction of the
memorial ended in 1861. The Crimean War Memorial features three members of the Guard
Regiments with a female personification of honor behind them. The statues themselves, cast
from the bronze of Russian cannons captured during the siege of Sevastopol, serve as a
monument to the accomplishments of the British soldiers who captured them. But this memorial
also shows a shift away from the great men that dominated earlier memorials to a more inclusive
commemoration of death. On one side of the Crimean War Memorial is a plaque that reads “To
the memory of 2152 Officers, Non-Com. Officers and Privates of the BRIGADE OF GUARDS
who fell during the war with Russia in 1854-1856. Erected by their comrades.” 40 Meant to
commemorate a single elite unit, this monument represents a new focus on the individual dead of
war in place of the Admirals and Generals who acted as heroic representations of Britannia
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herself. Although the names of individual soldiers are still absent, the Crimean War Memorial
acts as a small representation of the cost in lives of Britain’s victory in Crimea.
Almost forty years later, the Second Boer War matched the Crimean War for the amount
of death it produced in the British, and this time Imperial, army. Soldiers from Britain, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and British Ceylon, served in South Africa with more than 20,000 dying
during the conflict. 41 Despite this, no one built a grand monument to the victory or even to the
dead of the war in London. Instead, the British people commemorated the Second Boer War
locally across Britain with numerous small, privately commissioned, memorials. Located in
churches, parks, and other public locations, these small memorials focus almost exclusively on
the men from these communities who died serving the Empire in South Africa. They follow an
almost standard form. Whether statues of soldiers in their iconic pith helmets, bronze plaques, or
engravings in stone, nearly all of these monuments prominently feature a list of names for all
those from the local community who died during the war - the fathers and sons of the community
who never walked the streets or attended church services again. The monuments to the Second
Boer War may not have been national or even imperial in character, but they contain a personal
significance to those who paid the subscriptions to fund their building. 42
Another form of memorialization for the Second Boer War did not begin with veterans
associations or local governments, but with the efforts of the prestigious public schools whose
young alumni made up a significant portion of the army’s officer corps. 43 Overseen by
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prominent alumni and funded through subscriptions advertised in yearbooks and alumni
magazines, these memorials often had more to do with school pride than honoring the dead.
Taking the form of plaques or shrines in the schools’ chapels or sanctuaries, these memorials
reflected the school’s own values of service and a chivalric ideal of sacrifice in war. Less about
assuaging grief, these ceremonies were used to reinforce a martial spirit many in the upper
classes felt had been lost. 44 This almost romantic, chivalric, and even medieval view of war and
military service was later reflected in the monuments and literature of the First World War. 45
The Crimean and Second Boer wars were major conflicts for the British nation, but still
failed to reach a scale that demanded the government to directly take part in memorialization
efforts. The approximately 40,000 men who died during these wars represented less than .2% of
the British population in 1858. 46 While these losses are far from insignificant, they still did not
bring about a change in how Britain commemorated its war dead. These losses did, however,
bring about a new awareness of the lethality of modern war and the military and medical
community in Britain began to look towards the next European war and try to predict how
advancing military technologies and tactics would affect casualty rates. The British Medical
Journal highlighted the effect of technology on casualty rates with an article based on Balkan
War casualty rates that predicted 1.5 million casualties in the first month of a modern war
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between just two Great Powers. 47 Although they ultimately proved to be overestimates, these
studies proved that at least Britain's medical community looked towards the next European
conflict with trepidation.
Up until this point, the Indian Army almost exclusively operated within India itself. From
its earliest incarnations as an arm of the British East India Company the Indian Army existed to
ensure social order and support British rule. The Indian Mutiny of 1857 proved to the British that
a native army in India could also be the greatest threat to its rule. When the British began use of
new greased cartridges for the army’s rifles, many Indian soldiers refused to use them on
religious grounds, suspecting that the British used animal fats in the production of the grease.
Overly harsh punishment of those who refused to use the new cartridges sparked an uprising in
the Bengal Army near Meerut that soon spread to units throughout India. 48 The British
government and its loyal Indian allies put down the rebellion only after months of brutal fighting.
The battle to retake Delhi alone resulted in 2,000 British dead, as well as an equal number of
loyal Indian soldiers, and nearly 20,000 rebels. 49 When it ended, the rebellion shattered British
optimism in India and painted Indian soldiers as a dangerous threat to British rule. The British
government then unified the Indian Armies and placed them under direct control of the crown to
reduce the chances of an uprising happening again.
In the years following the Mutiny, the idea of mobilizing the Indian army, equipping it
with modern weapons and training, and deploying it in support of a European war seemed nearly
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unthinkable. It became even more unlikely that it would serve with distinction and its dead be
memorialized alongside British, Dominion, and colonial counterparts in cemeteries and
monuments following that war. Decades of loyal service following the Mutiny and the rapidly
expanding scope of the war on the Western Front left the British military with little choice. For
the first time in its history, the Indian Army mobilized for a large scale war and deployed outside
the subcontinent en masse. It went on to serve throughout the war in multiple theaters and its
soldiers received numerous awards including multiple Victoria Crosses - Britain’s highest award
for valor. 50
The general peace that Europe enjoyed for almost 60 years was shattered on June 28,
1914. During an official visit to Sarajevo meant to improve ties between the Austro-Hungarian
government and its restless Balkan holdings, Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife
Sophie made their way along streets crowded with onlookers in an open-topped automobile.
Among the crowd hid several assassins connected to the “Black Hand,” a secret military
organization intent on uniting all Serbian peoples under a single, independent government. When
one of the agents threw a bomb at the motorcade, the Archduke himself batted it away with the
resulting explosion injuring several passengers in the following car. The Archduke then ignored
advice to retire to a safe location and insisted on visiting the injured at the local hospital. When
his car then stopped after taking a wrong turn, twenty-year-old Gavrilo Princip stepped from the
crowd, leveled a pistol at the Archduke and fired two shots. By 11 am, both Franz Ferdinand and
his wife died from their wounds. 51 Almost one month later, Austria-Hungary declared war on
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Serbia and Europe’s complicated system of alliances, long standing political posturing, and
overly rigid plans for military mobilization led to the First World War.
The German army’s use of Belgium as a gateway into Northern France became the final
provocation that pushed a reluctant British Empire to join the war on August 4, 1914. 52 By
August 7 the first units of the British Expeditionary Force left for France and within ten days the
entire force of 160,000 men had been mobilized. 53 They arrived exactly where the French needed
them. Germany intended its thrust through Belgium to begin a great flanking maneuver meant to
bypass the majority of French defenses and quickly capture Paris. Combined with the men of the
BEF, the French forces defending Paris outnumbered the advancing Germans enough to
challenge their advance. The French and British halted the German offensive just miles from the
French capital in the Battle of the Marne. 54 As 1914 ended, so did maneuver warfare; the BEF
dug into trench lines stretching from Ypres south to near Albert where the British and French
lines met. Taken as a whole, the complex system of trenches occupied by the British stretched
for nearly 6,000 miles if laid end to end. The BEF occupied these lines for the remainder of the
war. 55
As the war in France rapidly escalated, it soon became apparent that the original 160,000
soldiers of the BEF would not be enough to fight a war in Europe, Africa, Mesopotamia, and the
Mediterranean. In order to address this deficiency, the British government drew upon the full
strength of its Empire. Nearly every region of the Empire began providing financial, logistical,
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and military support to the war effort. The British Dominions and India helped to bear a large
portion of this burden as well as adding their extensive manpower reserves and military forces to
the fight. By the end of the war, over five and a half million British soldiers had served in
uniform. 56 Soldiers from across the Empire joined them with over 620,000 Canadians 57 and
331,000 Australians 58 making up the largest contingents from the Dominions. The actions of the
Canadians and Australians not only helped to win the war, but also worked to define their
national identities. The Canadian success at Vimy Ridge and the ultimately unsuccessful efforts
of Australian and New Zealand soldiers to capture the Gallipoli peninsula are now central to the
grand narrative of the British Empire during the war.
The significant contributions of India and its armed forces are often less prominent in this
narrative of the British Empire during the First World War. Whereas Dominions such as Canada
and Australia maintained independent and sovereign governments within the British Empire,
India remained a colonial possession ruled by the Raj, Britain’s colonial government. Over 1.3
million Indian Soldiers served in nearly every theater of the war, making up by far the largest
Imperial force deployed during the conflict. 59 These soldiers also experienced triumph and
tragedy alongside their Dominion and colonial counterparts. Today Gallipoli, in present day
Turkey, is remembered primarily as an Australian and New Zealand soldiers (ANZACs)
experience. Fifteen thousand Indian soldiers fought alongside the British, French, and ANZACs
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who fought to capture the peninsula. 60 During the great offensives on the Western Front, often
remembered as British and French experiences, Indian divisions took part in the battles of Neuve
Chapelle, Festubert, and Loos as well as defending over seven miles of the frontline. 61 The
Indian Army also took a dominant role in the Mesopotamian campaign and experienced the
tragic siege at Kut-Al-Amara, where over 13,000 soldiers of the Indian Army surrendered after a
five month siege by Ottoman forces, and the triumphal capture of Baghdad in 1917. 62 Because of
this, the Mesopotamian Campaign became the defining Indian experience of the war. As
significant as the Indian efforts in Mesopotamia were, they are still often overshadowed in the
collective memory of the war by the exploits of T.E. Lawrence in the deserts of Arabia. In every
theater of the war India and its army made significant contributions to the Empire’s war effort,
yet the memory of these contributions remains secondary to those of Britain and the Dominions.
Examining these contributions and the ways chosen by the British government to honor them can
provide meaningful insight into The Raj and its memory.
If not for its imperial relationship with Britain, India would likely never have entered the
war. Much like Canada and Australia, India was geographically and even politically isolated
from the events in Europe that led to war. 63 The Indian Army also took part in few major
deployments outside of the subcontinent until the First World War. Even during the Second Boer
War where soldiers from across the Empire served, the British government avoided using nonwhite soldiers at all costs and only allowed Indians already living in Natal to volunteer for
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service and fight during the war. 64 Just twelve years later, the scale and ferocity of the First
World War, apparent even from its earliest stages, forced the British government to ignore past
prejudices and draw upon the full strength of its Empire. As the “jewel” in the crown of that
Empire and by far its largest possession, India represented a war asset that could not be ignored.
Although India’s economy eventually contributed nearly 173,000 animals, 3.7 million tons of
supplies and hundreds of millions of Pound sterling in war contributions and financing, its most
significant contribution remained the 1.3 million soldiers it sent to fight in Europe, Africa, the
Mediterranean, and the Middle East. 65
As significant as these contributions were, not all segments of Indian society initially
served in the Army. The average Indian soldier who fought during the First World War was a
product of the British recruitment policies based on the idea of “martial races.” Across the
Empire, the British categorized native peoples into those they saw as fit for military service and
those that were not. In India, the British almost exclusively defined those Indians living in the
northwest regions of the country including Punjab, North West Frontier, and Uttar Pradesh, as
belonging to martial races. With nearly 447,000 men recruited from within its borders, Punjab
alone contributed over one third of all recruits during the war. The soldiers recruited from these
regions were often poorly educated and existed within the world of their families and villages:
their lives defined by their caste and religion. They also spoke a wide variety of languages
including Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi. As the war progressed the recruitment policies of the Indian
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Army expanded beyond their traditional territories in order to provide the increasing numbers of
soldiers needed for the war. 66
Although created by the British and organized in a standard British form, the Indian
Army was a unique organization with its own units and ranks. The Indian soldiers who served
under British rule were commonly known as “sepoys” and the ranks of the Indian Army
generally paralleled those of the British, but used their own names. For instance, Sepoy was used
as a rank equivalent to a British Private, an Indian Naik equaled a British Corporal, and a
Havildar a British Sergeant. For officers an Indian Jemedar was equivalent to a British
Lieutenant, a Subedar a British Captain, and a Subedar Major a British Major. These
equivalencies were in organization only and nearly all Indian officers were junior in rank to
British officers. Indian cavalry units also used their own unique rank system. An example of this
is an Indian Cavalry Daffadar equaling a British sergeant.
In terms of religion, the Indian soldier could not have been more different from his
British and Dominion counterparts. While these soldiers were almost exclusively Christian, the
Indian soldier belonged to a number of religions not found in large numbers in most of the
Empire. At the beginning of the war, Christians represented less than one percent of the Indian
Army, with 10 percent being Gurkhas, 19 percent Sikh, 30 percent Hindu, and Muslims making
up the largest religion in the Army at 40 percent. These demographics resulted from the focus of
recruitment efforts in the country’s North West regions where the Indian Sikh heartland and
large Muslim populations are located. Muslims soldiers also dominated cavalry and artillery
units, Hindus represented the largest religion in the infantry, and Sikhs served predominantly in
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the infantry and cavalry. As the war progressed Hindus made up an increasingly large proportion
of the army. 67 The expansion of recruitment efforts beyond their traditional bounds during the
war meant that large sections of India’s population now shared in the military experience.
For these soldiers, the war began when the Meerut and Lahore divisions deployed to
France shortly after the war began. The first of these units left India on August 25, just 21 days
after the British government declared war. 68 Traveling from Karachi and Bombay, these
divisions arrived at Marseilles in late September and early October of 1914. Mere weeks later
they found themselves defending the front lines near the town of La Bessee. 69 Many stayed in
France until the end of the war, defending their lines from German raids and taking part in the
offensives at Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, and Loos. For the British officers who commanded
these units, the war was undoubtedly a shock that few were prepared for. For the Indian soldiers
they commanded, France offered a new experience far removed from anything they knew. Over
4,000 miles from home the soldiers of the Indian Army found themselves surrounded by
unfamiliar terrain, cultures, and weather. Their war in France proved a far cry from defending the
mountain passes and valleys of India’s North-West frontier. Coming from remote villages and
taking their first trips outside the country in crowded troop ships, the experience of seeing
Europe left a lasting impression on many sepoys.
For many Indian soldiers their first look at the capital of their Empire came after being
wounded in combat. Subedar-Major Sardar Bahadur Gugan of the 6th Jats described his
impressions of England to a friend during his stay at Brighton Hospital in January of 1915. “One
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should regard it as fairyland. The heart cannot be satiated with seeing the sights, for there is no
other place like this in the world. It is as if one were in the next world. It cannot be described. A
motor car comes to take us out. The King and Queen talked with us for a long time. I have never
been so happy in my life as I am here.” 70 Although much of this happiness undoubtedly came
from being in England instead of at the front, the wonder of seeing Britain acted as a powerful
experience that must have brought British rule into a very real perspective.
Before they were sent to England for medical treatment the soldiers of the Indian Army
made their way from the ports of southern France to the front lines near La Bassee. The cities
and countryside of France made just as powerful an impression as those of England. A soldier
listed simply as L. R. described France in a letter home to a friend. “As for beauty, I believe
France is the home of beauty. Here everything is beautiful. The hills are covered with beautiful
pastures from top to bottom all over the country. The soil is rich for fruits. The woods, even, are
good. Every village, even a small one, is built beautifully into beautiful roads everywhere.
Everywhere there is cleanliness.” 71 Sentiments such as these were repeated by soldiers in
countless letters home. Some could not help but compare the perceived beauty of England and
France to conditions back in India. Writing from a hospital in Marseilles, Shah Nawaz made a
blunt comparison. “You may be sure that India will not rise to the pitch of perfection for Europe
for another two thousand years.” 72
The longer they stayed in France though the more their views could change. While still
often awed by the cities and villages behind the lines, the realities of the war became
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overwhelming once their units spent time at the front. Endless shelling and raids combined with
worsening weather conditions and mounting casualties made the war unbearable for many Indian
soldiers during the first winter of the war. A Muslim soldier from Southern India wrote home
that “[t]he war is a calamity on three worlds and has caused me to cross the seas and live here.
The cold is so great that it cannot be described. Snow falls day and night and covers the ground
to a depth of two feet. We have not seen the sun for four months. Thus we are sacrificed.” 73 Not
only did the winter bring the misery of cold, it also brought about a stagnation in the trenches
with no movement forward that became the soldier’s reality for the remainder of their time in
France. No more than fifty paces from the German lines, bullets and artillery fire seemed to
come down as thick as the snow. When the snow melted, the mud rose to the soldiers’ waists.
The soldiers of the Indian Army endured these conditions as they defended their trenches for the
winter from an attack that never came. 74 It must have seemed to many Indian soldiers that
conditions could not get any worse. Brought halfway around the world to fight for their Emperor,
the soldiers in France instead found themselves suffering through a harsh winter and mounting
casualties without any real gains to show for it.
Despite this, many soldiers maintained their faith not only in the war effort, but also in
the Emperor they fought and died for. Few Indians serving in the Army ever visited Britain prior
to the war, and even fewer ever saw their Emperor in person. Despite this, he maintained a high
level of respect among the soldiers of the Indian Army. A Garhwali Subedar serving during the
war expressed his belief that “[i]t is a noble fate for us to be allowed to sacrifice our bodies for
our king. If our ancestors help us and god shows us favour, if we die on the battlefield in the
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service of our king, this is equal to entering heaven” 75 The admiration for his Emperor and his
willingness to die for him represented a sentiment repeated throughout the war. Although
relations with the Raj at home could be strained at best and independence movements seemed to
gain momentum every year, the emperor himself, George V, remained a revered figure the
service of whom gave the sacrifices of war meaning. 76
These sacrifices proved to be severe. By the end of 1914 almost half of the 160,000
soldiers of the BEF had become casualties with over 50,000 of these taking place in the Flanders
region during the First Battle of Ypres. 77 These losses not only proved the value of
reinforcements from Britain’s Empire, it also showed that Britain alone was not prepared for the
scale of the war ahead. The early victory envisaged by all sides of the war vanished into the
winter of 1914. With it disappeared any hope that the war would do anything but escalate as all
of the belligerents used the winter months to strengthen their armies and prepare for the
inevitable offensives that would begin with the coming of spring in 1915.
The BEF was not the only part of British society making sacrifices and mobilizing though
and the public began to support the war effort from its very beginning. In the early months of the
war many volunteer efforts began to fill the gaps where the army’s preparations were
insufficient. One of these efforts came in the unlikely form of Sir Arthur Stanley, president of the
Royal Automobile Club. Seeing a deficiency in the availability of ambulances to serve near the
frontline, Stanley brokered a truce between the often uncooperative Red Cross and St. John
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Ambulance. 78 This resulted in a Red Cross led effort that used volunteers and donated vehicles to
form Mobile Ambulance Units that helped to collect wounded near the front and transport them
to aid stations. 79 Fabian Ware, the man who would have more influence on the commemoration
of the Empire’s war dead than any other, commanded one of this units. During this early period
of the war, Ware oversaw a volunteer force searching the French countryside for wounded
soldiers. They also found the quickly dug, often poorly marked, and scattered graves of British
soldiers. While not originally their official concern, under Ware’s leadership the MAUs began
registering these graves and doing what they could to improve their conditions. Throughout the
war, Ware and his associates in the MAUs continued their efforts to address the often haphazard
techniques used to bury the dead and register their graves. In early 1915, these efforts resulted in
the creation of the Graves Registration Commission, giving Ware the rank of Major and
complete authority over British graves registration efforts in Europe. By August of that year the
Commission registered 18,173 graves and photographed 6,000 for their records. 80
For most of the war, the Graves Registration Commission continued the endless work of
cataloguing the seemingly countless graves of the Empire’s war dead in Europe. In the final days
of 1915, however, the French Government passed “The Law of 29 December” that allowed for
the permanent burial and memorialization of British soldiers on French land, financing provided
by the French government, with their design, construction, and upkeep under the control of a yet
to be determined organization within the British government. The war caused so such death and
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destruction by this point that the French government realized allowing the British to oversee their
own burial efforts was the only way to ensure these efforts were even possible.
In 1915 the British government established one of the most significant burial policies of
the entire war. When the powerful family of deceased Lieutenant W. E. Gladstone arranged for
his exhumation and reburial in England, Ware and his associates realized that only the upper
classes would be able to afford such action. Their sons and fathers could return to Britain for
their final rest, while those of the poor and middle classes remained in foreign lands, never to
return home. The government deemed this unacceptable and official British policy banned the
repatriation of soldiers and made their bodies property of the state. 81 The dead of war no longer
belonged to their families, they instead became nationalized as a symbolic part of the nation’s
grief and a symbol of its war effort. 82 This nationalization of the dead also meant that the burial
and memorialization of any soldier of the Empire who fell during the war became the sole
responsibility of the British government. The first full year of the Great War caused what the
Crimean and Boer wars could not. Faced with previously unthinkable numbers of war dead, the
British government took full responsibility for the care of its fallen soldiers. With the
implementation of these policies the framework for the Imperial War Graves Commission had
almost been completed.
During March and April of 1917 the British government held the first of two Imperial
War Conferences in London to discuss the war and its progress. Attending this conference were
members of the Imperial War Cabinet including Prime Minister Lloyd George, Leader of the
House of Lords Lord George Curzon, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of
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Commons Bonar Law, and representatives from all of the Dominions and India. 83 On the 24th of
March the Conference passed a motion for the creation of a new government organization to
oversee the burial and memorialization of the Empire’s war dead “for the purpose of ensuring
that the graves of the heroes who gave their lives for the Empire at the most critical time in its
history shall be cared for in a manner worthy of the deeds they performed and the sacrifices they
made.” 84 A direct successor of the Graves Registration Commission, the newly created Imperial
War Graves Commission was organized with His Royal Highness Edward, Prince of Wales, as
President and numerous other government officials as members. These officials included the
Secretary of State for War, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Secretary of State for
India. Written during the conference, a draft charter laid out the legal and structural details of the
Commission. The early pages of this draft contained a statement declaring the Commission’s
commitment to a vision of the British Empire as a loyal and enduring union. Those who wrote
the charter hoped that “by honouring and perpetuating the memory of their common sacrifice,
tend to strengthen the bonds of union between all classes and races in Our Dominions and to
promote a feeling of common citizenship and of loyalty and devotion to Us and to the Empire of
which they are subjects.” 85 While the Commission considered the memorialization of the
Empire’s fallen soldiers as its primary purpose, building a monument to the Empire and its unity
was clearly another critical goal.
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Although the final version of the IWGC’s charter varied only slightly from the draft, the
India office quickly expressed concern over the draft’s language. On 13 April, just days after the
presentation of the draft, the India office sent a letter, with the consent of Lord Chamberlain, to
Major General Ware, now the Commission’s director, expressing a desire that the word “graves”
in the charter should include the cremation grounds central to Hindu burial rights. Signed by
India’s representatives to the conference Sir James Meston, Lieutenant-Governor of the United
Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and Ganga Singh, Maharaja of Bikanir, this letter marked the
beginning of a long relationship between the Indian Government and the Commission over
religious and cultural considerations for the Indian soldiers who fell during the war. 86 It should
be noted, however, that this relationship was between the British and their own colonial
government in India, not an independent Indian government. Just ten days after the mailing of
this letter, the War Conference circulated a document citing revisions to the charter and
including an addition to section V explicitly stating that that use of the word “cemetery” included
all Hindu and non-Christian cremation grounds “in so far as may be consistent with Hindu or
such other religious customs as may be applicable.” 87 Before even being officially constituted
the Commission swiftly acted on the advice of the Indian government to help insure the religious
rights of India’s war dead.
Although it is doubtful that this request met any real opposition from the War Cabinet,
Meston and Singh undoubtedly found an ally for their request in Lord George Curzon. Former
Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Curzon took a keen interest in modernization efforts in
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the Indian Army during his six year tenure, especially the issue of Indianization of the Indian
Army’s officer corps. In order advance this effort, Curzon created the Imperial Cadet Corps, a
program for young Indian men from noble families to receive officer commissions of British
rank. Although this program ultimately failed to bring about large scale change in the Army,
many recognized Curzon as the pioneer in this effort. 88 Curzon’s influence, along with the
presence of Meston and Singh on the War Cabinet, shows that those who wrote the
Commission’s charter were far from uninterested bureaucrats or naive concerning the
complexities of Indian affairs. They instead represented a cross section of the political elite from
across the Empire and included men who served in the highest levels of the Indian government.
Even Fabian Ware, the founder, director, and most influential person in the Commission’s
history, came from a colonial background. Mentored by Alfred Milner, former High
Commissioner for Southern Africa, Ware spent several years as a Director of Education for the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony.

89

Like almost every aspect of political, cultural, and

military affairs during this period, the imperial experience influenced the Commission in a very
real way. This influence continued to show throughout the war and following years as the
Commission set policy in regards to Indian soldiers and made decisions regarding how their
remains should be treated, memorials designed, and memory defined.
The imperial influence must also be keep in mind when examining the Commission’s
policies. The IWGC’s commitment to equal treatment of all the Empire’s war dead, and the
policies that followed these principles, were undoubtedly progressive for the time. The British
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Empire, though, was anything but equal, with predominantly white populations such as Canada
and Australia gaining Dominion status, while non-white populations, including India, remained
possessions of the British crown. As progressive as the IWGC was in its policies and inclusion of
Indians in its administration, it still existed as part of a system that favored white Christians at
the expense of all others. Even when the British government did make efforts to improve the
lives of its non-white subjects, it mostly did so out of a paternalistic viewpoint where the British
nation gifted civilization upon its subjects, often seen as unable, or unwilling, to better
themselves. Some of the Commission’s most important policies, though originating out of
seemingly practical considerations, still end up treating white soldiers of the Indian Army, and
upper class Indians from preferred castes, with the highest respect, while making compromises
where the Indian rank and file, often poor and from lower castes, are concerned.

37

EUROPE AND MESOPOTAMIA: A DIVISION OF WAR AND
MEMORIALIZATION

“Don’t be grieved at my death because I shall die arms in hand, wearing the warrior’s
clothes. This is the most happy death that anyone can die.” - Jemadar Indar Singh, 15 September
1916. France 90

Although the winter of 1914 came to an end, the snow ceased falling, and the brutal cold
would give way to warmer weather, this proved to be no reprieve for the Indian Army in France.
While the winter may have been almost unbearable, it at least marked a pause in major combat
operations. As the weather improved, however, both sides began preparing for their first full year
of the war and the inevitable offensives it promised to bring. Throughout 1915 the Indian Army
took part in three major offensives including the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March, the Battle
of Festubert in May, and the Battle of Loos from late September to mid-October. 91 At the same
time, in warmer climes, Indian Expeditionary Force D endured the first full year of the
Mesopotamian Campaign, the British effort to secure oil supplies in modern day Iraq and to
secure the Tigris and Euphrates rivers by capturing Baghdad. Fought primarily by the Indian
Army and lasting the full length of the war, the Mesopotamian Campaign truly defined India’s
experience during the First World War.
Examining the war in Mesopotamia also helps to reveal a contradiction in the IWGC’s
efforts to commemorate Indian soldiers' service. The clear distinction between Indian
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experiences in Europe and in Mesopotamia and the policies adopted by the Commission
following the war worked to exacerbate this division. This division started in the war, caused by
the fundamental differences between the campaigns on the Western Front and in Mesopotamia,
and created a long lasting effect on the memory of Indian involvement in the war. In Europe, the
British and French governments closely controlled the war effort, including the operations of the
Indian army. French and British hospitals treated Indian casualties once they cleared aide
stations, and Graves Registration Units meticulously recorded their dead for future burial or
cremation. Those units that fought in Mesopotamia operated under the control of an
expeditionary effort thousands of miles from their respective governments. Inadequate aide
stations treated casualties before sending them down river on barges to Basra, where they
reached an actual hospital. The Indian Army in Mesopotamia was constantly on the move and
forced to hastily record casualties and burials with no serious Graves Registration Units devoted
to the effort. As much as the IWGC pushed for equal treatment of all of the Empire’s war dead,
the realities of the war in Mesopotamia created a marked divergence between commemoration
there and in Europe that still affects the memory of Indian involvement in the war to this day.
The beginning of this divergence in the commemoration of the Indian war experience
began in 1915, well before the Commission began planning its commemoration efforts. In
Europe, the Indian Army contributed to many of Britain’s initial efforts that year to adapt to the
rapidly-changing nature of the war. During the first planned British offensive of the war at the
Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut Division took part in spearheading
the attack. Beginning at 8:05 am, it took only fifteen minutes for German trenches to be captured
and by 10 am the British controlled the city of Neuve Chapelle for the first time since its capture
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by the Germans at the Battle of La Bassee five months earlier. 92 A Sikh sepoy serving with the
59th Rifles remembered that “[t]he attack came off on the 10th at seven o’clock in the morning.
We fix bayonets and look towards the enemy. The enemy trenches are two yards off [sic]. They
have been well built. In front is barbed wire and we are not expected to attack here. With a shout
to our guru we hurl ourselves forward. The enemy bullets scorch our heroes, while machine guns
and cannons spread their shot upon us. We leap the wire entanglements and overwhelm the
enemy, killing some and capturing the rest.” 93 With the victory at Neuve Chapelle the Indian
Army reclaimed the city it failed to defend in its first action of the war.
The impact of this battle on the Indian soldiers who fought there cannot be overstated.
One sepoy described the carnage in a letter written after the battle. ”So many men were killed
and wounded that they could not be counted and of the Germans the number of casualties is
beyond calculation. When we reached their trenches we used the bayonet and the kukri, and
blood was shed so freely that we could not recognize each other’s faces; the whole ground was
covered with blood. There were heaps of men’s heads, and some soldiers were without legs,
others had been cut in two, some without hands and others without eyes. The scene was
indescribable.” 94 For the Indian Army, this brutality marked their first experience of modern
industrial war, and would remain a reality on the Western Front until the end of the war. Neuve
Chapelle also came to define the Indian experience in Europe and the IWGC built its memorial
to the Indian war dead on the Western Front near to the site of the battle.
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The Meerut Division went on the offensive again during the Second Battle of Artois
when its soldiers took part in the British attack at Festubert in late March. A combined attack by
British, Canadian, and Indian infantry, Festubert provides just one example of the Imperial effort
on the Western Front. It also inflicted heavy casualties on the Indians who fought there. Luddar
Singh, serving with the 41st Dogras, described the battle in a letter home. “My brother, on the
9th of May, there was an attack by the whole of the English and the French, and the whole line of
the Indians….So, my friend, when my regiment went up to the trenches for the attack, it had a
strength of 850 men. When the attack began, in the course of one hour 411 men were wounded,
and 80 were killed, and 341 [sic] remained unhurt. On the 13th again there was a small attack,
and severe losses…” 95 In only one hour of fighting over half of Luddar Singh’s regiment were
killed or wounded with many more joining them over the course of the battle. During the Third
Battle of Artois the Indians witnessed the first use of gas by the British at the subsidiary Battle of
Loos. A sepoy serving with the 2nd Lancers described gas attacks at Arras in 1916. “A new kind
of smoke has been invented which is let loose in the trenches and if you get a sniff of it you lose
consciousness at once. It does not matter if you are armed or not, as you lose all your senses.” 96
Gas attacks joined artillery, machine guns, and countless other modern weapons to make the
Western Front unforgettably violent for those who served there. As the war progressed the Indian
divisions in France eventually transferred to other theaters, mostly to reinforce a stalled
campaign in Mesopotamia. The infantry that remained held their lines while the cavalry, largely
unsuited to the war in Mesopotamia, patiently waited for the breakthrough behind enemy lines
that never came.
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On July 1 of 1916 the British launched the first attack of the Battle of the Somme, a battle
that defined the British war experience more than any other and produce death on an incredible
scale. On the first day alone over 20,000 British and Imperial soldiers fell in combat, the single
bloodiest day in British military history. 97 Shah Mirza, serving with the 20th Deccan Horse,
described an advance on High Wood two weeks into the battle: “What I saw in the course of the
advance I shall never forget. We had to pass amongst the dead bodies of the men who had fallen
during the morning’s attack, and the trenches were full of German dead. The ground was torn
and rent to pieces by the shell-fire and there were holes five and six feet deep. On that day, 1,700
prisoners were taken.” 98 Today The Somme is more than just a battle for the British nation, it is
an event that defines the very war itself.
While the Indian Army units in France, Expeditionary Force A, took part in the great
offensives on the Western Front, Indian Expeditionary Force D deployed to a very different
theatre than their counterparts in France. Far from the trenches of the Western Front,
Mesopotamia’s importance to the British war effort lay in the sources of oil it contained that
fueled the modern war, and as a way to threaten the Ottoman Empire’s southern borders.
According to the Commission’s official history of the campaign, British objectives in
Mesopotamia sought “to deny enemy access to the head of the Persian Gulf, to safeguard the
supply of oil obtained from the Anglo-Persian Company’s oilfields [sic] in Arabistan, and to
support the Arabs who were believed to be disaffected with Turkish rule.” On the 6th of
November, 1914, just one day after Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire, Indian
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Expeditionary Force D, comprised of units from the 6th Poona Division combined with units of
the British Army, made their initial landings at Fao. Located at the tip of the Fao, or Faw,
peninsula, and dominating the entrance to the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers, Fao controlled the water routes from the Persian Gulf into the Mesopotamian
interior. After capturing the fortress protecting the port, and the nearby city of Basra, the
combined British and Indian force began advancing inland, eventually forcing the Ottomans to
evacuate Basra and retreat north. 99 By the 23rd the British captured Basra and within the week
the entire 6th Poona division deployed to support the campaign. Further advances led to the
capture of Qurna in early December and the British began to settle in for the winter. Early 1915
saw both sides reinforcing their armies in Mesopotamia with Indian Expeditionary Force D
eventually consisting of the 6th and 12th divisions supported by the 6th Cavalry Brigade. After
the British repulsed an Ottoman counterattack at Shaiba on 12 April, they began offensives into
Arabistan and up the Tigris River to Amara with both operations resulting in a resounding
success. By early June the British secured Arabistan and its oil facilities as well as Amara. These
victories cost the British and Indian armies a mere 25 casualties. 100
The conditions the Indian Army encountered in Mesopotamia differed significantly from
those endured by Indian soldiers in France. The Indian Army deployed to Mesopotamia aboard
converted cruise liners with over 1,200 soldiers packed so tightly below decks that breathing
became difficult. Temperatures could reach well over 90 degrees and ocean swells could make it
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difficult to even stand at times. 101 Once disembarked, extreme heat and widespread disease
became more dangerous to the men than enemy fire. After arriving at Fao in late August of 1915
as reinforcements, nearly 300 men of a battalion from the 6th Hants traveled upriver to Amarah.
By the time it arrived in early September, barely 100 of these men were fit for service. Combat
deaths accounted for only roughly 50 of these losses with the rest being entirely due to heat and
disease. Robert Palmer, a British officer with the 6th Hants recorded that “[t]here has been an
enormous amount of sickness during the hot weather, four-fifths of which has been heat-stroke
and malaria. There have been a few cases of enteric and a certain number of dysentery; but next
to heat and malaria more men have been knocked out by sores and boils than by any disease. It
takes ages for the smallest sore to heal.” 102 The soldiers of the British and Indian armies found
campaigning under these conditions hard enough, but once in combat the challenges of desert
warfare with little to no cover only worked to make matters worse. Robert Palmer noted that
“[t]he troops who have come from France say that in this respect this action has been more trying
than either Neuve Chapelle or Ypres, because, as they say, it is like advancing over a billiardtable all the way.” The extreme heat could even make it impossible for artillery to accurately
target enemy positions due the extreme effect of mirages caused by heat distorting the horizon.
The medical services could only provide the most basic care to the wounded and no ambulances
were available to carry them to the rear. During an action on January 7th, 1916 along the banks
of the Tigris River, only a dozen stretchers could be found to carry over 300 casualties five miles
to a dressing station in the rear. Once there the wounded joined another 4,000 casualties being
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treated by only 4 doctors in tents packed with 30 men at a time. 103 These conditions only
worsened as the army advanced further and further away from its main base at Basra. Robert
Palmer would be killed in action during the Battle of Um Al Hannah on June 21, 1916. He was
27 years old.
With the lower sections of the Tigris secured British attention shifted west to the
Euphrates and led to a successful offensive on the town of Nasiriya in mid-July. What followed
set off a series of events leading to the greatest tragedy of India’s involvement in the war. After
the capture of Nasiriya, British forces once again shifted focus to the Tigris and used Amara as a
launching point for an advance aimed at capturing Kut al Amara, a city approximately 100 miles
south of Baghdad, on September 1. Spearheaded by the 6th Poona Division, the capture of Kut
on September 28 cost the British 1,233 dead with an almost equal number of Ottomans taken
prisoner. Seeking to take advantage of their momentum and recently reinforced by two Indian
Divisions from France, British commanders made the decision to attempt to capture Baghdad.
On November 22 British forces reached the ancient city of Ctesiphon where the Ottomans built
and occupied defensive positions. Meeting strong opposition and outnumbered by Ottoman
reinforcements, The British failed to take the city and began a retreat south closely pursued by
the Ottoman forces that repulsed them. Reaching Kut on 3 December, General Townshend,
commander of the British forces, made the fateful decision to halt the retreat and fortify Kut and
the peninsula it occupies. Just four days later the 11,600 soldiers and 3,500 followers 104 of the
British and Indian Armies found themselves under siege by the pursuing Ottomans. 105
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Already exposed to extreme heat, an epidemic of malaria, and long distance marches
during their advance toward Baghdad and the resulting retreat, the soldiers besieged at Kut found
themselves already pushed to the limits of their endurance. Cut off from resupply, the British
Army at Kut began rationing everything it could. Ammunition, medical supplies, and most
importantly food, all became precious commodities. As the siege continued food supplies began
to dwindle and in its last month of April British soldiers received only 1,850 calories per day and
Indians 1,110. Starvation combined with disease killed many and weakened the rest while
widespread diarrhea from contaminated Tigris river water killed 200 men alone. These
conditions led to an average of fifteen soldiers dying every day in April. On the final day of the
siege only twenty-nine emaciated artillery horses remained as a source of food. 106 Although a
relief force sent to lift the siege spent almost four months attempting to reach Kut, it encountered
heavy resistance and suffered at least 12,000 casualties in the attempt. After nearly five full
months under siege, completely out of food, and with no hope of relief, General Townshend
surrendered the city and all British and Indian forces defending it on 29 April, 1916. Out of the
15,100 soldiers and followers who entered the city in December of 1915, approximately 13,000,
including General Townshend himself, became POWs. 107
Although British forces in Mesopotamia, now under the command of Sir Stanley Maude,
went on to eventually capture Baghdad on March 11, 1917, the surrender of Townshend’s army
at Kut marked one of the largest surrenders of British soldiers in history and what could be
described as one of the worst Allied defeats of the entire war. Even General Maude did not

106

Major-General Sir Patrick Hehir, “Effects of Chronic Starvation During The Siege of Kut,”
The British Medical Journal 1, no. 3205 (1922): 865-868.
107
Imperial War Graves Commission, The Basra Memorial, WG 219/19 Pt. 2, 1930.
46

survive the campaign, falling victim to disease on 18 November at Baghdad. Although the
British and Ottomans continued to clash in several large actions in early 1918, the Mesopotamian
campaign effectively ended by the final months of 1917. A final push towards Mosul designed to
put pressure on the Ottomans before the signing of the Armistice began in October. In thirteen
days of fighting culminating in the Battle of Sharqat the British and Indian forces captured
11,322 Ottoman soldiers and suffered 1,886 casualties. 108
The final act of the Mesopotamian campaign could be said to be the return of the
thousands of British and Indian POWs captured by the Ottomans. During the course of the
campaign over 21,000 soldiers, including those captured at Kut, found themselves in Ottoman
POW camps. For those captured at Kut, already suffering from starvation and wounds, the
journey to these camps proved to be a brutal, and deadly, experience. The Ottomans first
marched these POWs, already starving and not fed for two days after their capture, 109 north to
Baghdad, and then transferred them by train to Samarra, before finishing their journey with a 500
mile march into Asia Minor. The Ottomans immediately put anyone lucky enough to survive the
journey to work building railways until finally placing them in POW camps once they became
too broken down to work. It took a further ten years before the bodies of those who died in
Ottoman custody could be exhumed and reburied at the North Gate of Baghdad War Cemetery.
Despite these efforts, the graves of 2,146 POWs known to have died in Ottoman custody have
never been found. 110
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Even with the signing of the Armistice and the de facto end of the war, fighting in
Mesopotamia continued. In June of 1920 a rebellion broke out against British post-war rule.
British and Indian forces, many sent as reinforcements, once again went to war in Mesopotamia
to put down the rebellion and effectively subdued it by February of 1921. Even though the
belligerents involved signed the various treaties that ended the First World War by 1920,
Mesopotamia claimed another 2,250 British and Indian casualties. 850 of these died during the
rebellion. In total, 890,000 officers and men of the British and Indian Armies served in
Mesopotamia. 50,000 of these died in combat, fell victim to disease, or became Prisoners of War.
The British government officially listed 41,074 of these men as dead with nearly 1,000 more,
including those killed during the Rebellion of 1920, dying between 1918 and the official end of
the war in 1921. Of these men, over 40,000 were laid to rest in unmarked graves. The
Commission’s official history describes the Mesopotamian campaign as “more difficult and
more full of hardship than any other except the East African; and in it the British soldiers
equaled, and the Indian soldiers surpassed, their record of achievement in the other campaigns of
the World War.” 111
No matter what theater of the war India’s soldiers fought in, they experienced death on a
scale they could not imagine. The loss of their fellow soldiers and the images of death they
encountered made permanent impressions on most of these soldiers and become a defining factor
in their memory of the war. Santa Singh, serving in France, wrote to his mother in 1915 to
describe the sheer scale of death caused by the war. “Many sons of mothers, brothers of sisters,
and brothers of mothers have been lying dead for a whole year on the field of battle. A year has
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passed and there they lie. He who sees them for the first time says that there is no place left
empty. All the ground is covered with corpses.” 112 Far from a few scattered remains, these
bodies turned the battlefields of the war into a landscape of death where the living and the dead
shared the same ground for years on end. Asim Ullah, serving with the 19th Lancers in France
described the experience of living with such death in a letter home. “May god keep your eyes
from beholding the state of things here. There are heaps and heaps of dead bodies, the sight of
which upsets me. The stench is so overwhelming that one can, with difficulty, endure it for ten or
fifteen minutes. Fine, stalwart young men are stricken down into the dust, and others are
struggling in the combat like fish pulled out of the water and thrown down on the sand, with their
handsome faces dimmed by the grime of war.” 113 But in this death the soldiers could still find
some beauty, at least in those lucky soldiers whose remains received proper burials, a beauty that
came to be reflected in the cemeteries and memorials the Commission built after the war.
Jemedar Man Singh of the 6th Cavalry wrote home that “[h]ere and there are the graves of
gallant youths who have died for their country, and god has covered their graves with wild
flowers. These are the heroes who gave their lives to drive out the tyrant German.” 114 For the
majority of the dead though, it took years before their remains would be put to rest.
The stagnant nature of the war in France led to these scenes of mass death and even with
the improved conditions under the IWGC and its Graves Registration Units, the British still
found it necessary to conduct quick burials near to the site of death following battle when
possible. Soldiers killed near their own lines could be retrieved and buried without considerable
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risk. The large numbers of soldiers who fell in no-man’s-land in the course of large-scale attacks
and smaller raids, or whose remains simply became lost in the chaos of the war, posed a more
serious challenge. Where the most intense fighting occurred bodies simply had to be left where
they fell, unreachable until the front lines moved or the war finally ended. In 1916 Daya Ra,
serving with the 2nd Lancers in France noted that “[a]t some places corpses are found of men
killed in 1914, with uniform and accoutrements still on. Large flies, which have become
poisonous through feasting on dead bodies, infest the trenches, and huge fat rats run about there.
By the blessing of god the climate of this country is cold, and for that reason corpses do not
decompose quickly.” 115 After more than four years of war countless bodies from both sides
joined the dead who lay where they fell, becoming less and less identifiable as time and weather
brought decomposition, artillery continued to destroy everything it touched, and information not
already written into graves registration records became lost. Only after the war ended and its
battlefields fell silent could serious efforts begin to rectify this situation. This meant that, at least
until the end of the war, large numbers of Indian dead did not receive proper funeral rites from
the British government due to the harsh realities of the war. It also meant that the longer the war
continued the more difficult, or even impossible in some circumstances, identification and
reburial efforts became.
These difficulties in identifying and burying the dead prompted the Commission to create
an Indian Graves Committee in March of 1918 to oversee burial and memorialization efforts
regarding Indian soldiers and address the issues that emerged during the war. Comprised of
Under Secretary of State for India The Lord Islington, High Commissioner for the Union of
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South Africa The Rt. Hon. W. P. Schreiner, Sahibzada Aftab Khan, and Sir. Prabhashankar D.
Pattani, this committee brought together men with extensive experience in the Indian and
colonial governments. 116 Although the Commission previously included government officials
familiar with imperial affairs in its operations, Khan and Pattani represent interesting additions
that added new depth to the Commission’s attempts to address the legal and religious issues of
commemoration. Sahibzada Aftab Khan, a Muslim and lawyer by trade, served as Vice
Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University following the war and advocated heavily for higher
education for Indians. 117 Sir Prabhashankar D. Pattani, a Hindu and former Prime Minister of
Bhavnagar state in Gujarat, also advocated for education. Together they acted as the
Commission’s primary consultants on matters concerning their respective religions for the
duration of its memorialization efforts. The elite status of these men also shows a discrepancy in
the parts of Indian society that had a say in memorialization efforts. Men like Khan and Pattani
were highly educated and born into the very highest levels of Indian society. Throughout the
history of the Raj Britain had allied itself with such men and afforded them a level of access and
respect not available to the common Indian. Although it would be impractical for the
Commission to survey the Indian public on their own views about memorialization efforts, it
should still be remembered that these elite men essentially spoke for all Indians in regards to
Commission policy. In regards to the Indian Graves Committee itself their recommendations
focused on the major and immediate issues at hand. In the case of Muslim burials they
recommended that “except in cases where there was the slightest apprehension of the grave being
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moved, Mohammedan graves should be left undisturbed.” If reinterment became necessary then
it should take place at a central cemetery. 118 For Hindu burials the Committee decided that all
efforts should be made to exhume and cremate the bodies, with the ashes being consigned back
to the elements. If cremations could not be carried out, then headstones should be placed over the
graves.
The numerous religious backgrounds of Indian soldiers made it crucial for the IWGC to
identify remains before taking any further action. While nearly all British and Dominion soldiers
required Christian burials, the sepoys of the Indian Army and their numerous religious
backgrounds with unique burial rites required positive identification before burials or cremations
could take place. Accidentally cremating the remains of a Muslim soldier or leaving a Hindu
soldier’s remains buried when cremation was possible represented a profound violation of burial
rites for both religions. This made identifying Indian remains a top priority for the Commission.
By 1921, Lt. General Sir Alexander Cobbe, a senior officer in the India office and veteran soldier
with the Indian Army, wrote a letter to the Commission stating that “the great majority of the
graves of Indian fighting men were unmarked and lost” and asked for a Major Blacker to
compile guidelines for identifying remains. 119 The Commission took great care in identifying
these remains and provided workers with detailed guides and materials based on Major Blacker’s
report for determining the unit, religion, and racial background of unidentified soldiers. The most
basic of these tools included maps of the areas where Indian units saw action, tables showing
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casualty numbers for each area by battalion, and photographs of all relevant buttons, badges, and
uniform insignia. Even more detailed information could be provided in certain circumstances and
one note informed workers that “the sepoys in France seldom wore pagris, that Gurkhas usually
wore hats and kukins, [and] that the only infantry who wore the old 1903 pattern bandolier
equipment was that of the Lahore and Meerut divisions.” Signet rings could also indicate that
remains belonged to a sepoy. The officer who wrote this report even advocated for the use of
phrenology, “with all diffidence,” to help identify remains. The skulls of “[t]he more mongoloid
Gurkhas, Magars and Gurungs” could be distinguished from those of Aryans through
measurements. Also “the Seythian, that is the Jat, who, whether Musalman, Sikh, or Hindu,
forms such an overwhelming proportion of the Punjab Army is renowned for the size of his thigh
bones.” 120 Phrenology later took on a more sinister character in future racist ideologies, and the
“diffidence” of the officer who made this suggestion shows that the Commission was already
aware of the controversy surrounding these methods.
Once the Commission identified these soldiers it needed to reinter the remains in an
appropriate cemetery, or cremate them in accordance with Hindu and Sikh burial practices.
Although the Commission respected these rites and worked to proceed with cremations, many
obstacles stood in the way of accomplishing this. In Europe, French law complicated these
efforts. In late 1921, Lord Arthur Browne raised a concern that under French law, many of “the
graves will be opened in course of time and the remains thrown into ossuaries” by the French
government during its own reburial efforts following the war. This same letter also mentions that
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French law often made the exhumation and cremation of these remains “impracticable.” 121 While
French law complicated cremation efforts, it also provided the Commission with a way to
sidestep the issue and instead focus its efforts on reinterment instead.
Less than a week after Lord Browne expressed his concerns, a Colonel Chitty wrote to
Major A. L. Ingpen highlighting the fact that when cremation is not possible, the Hindu faith has
“no objection to reinterment.” For this reason, the Principal Assistant Secretary of the
Commission requested that a protective note be created stating that cremation “was impossible.”
In order to accomplish this, the Commission requested that Ingpen make “leading” inquiries to
the French government in order to obtain a statement that “it is generally against their laws of
hygiene and decency” for cremations to take place. 122 Once the French Ministry of the Interior
reviewed these inquiries, it informed the Commission that French law forbade cremation except
when performed in crematoriums certified by the government. It also warned the Commission
that any unsanctioned attempt to cremate a body outside of these facilities would be stopped by
the police and legal action taken against those responsible. Any exemption for these laws in the
case of Indian soldiers required an official, written request. 123 Rather than push the French
government on the issue, it seems the Commission sought to limit the use of cremations in favor
of reinterment. With the desired response in hand, Major Ingpen asked the Principal Assistant
Secretary of the IWGC if such a written request should be presented to the French government. It
appears that Ingpen received no response and made no such request of the French. Given the
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lengths the Commission went to in order to positively identify and correctly rebury Indian
soldiers, it is likely that it took this course of action, at least in part, out of practical
considerations. Although recovering and respectfully putting to rest the remains of India’s fallen
soldiers already required massive effort on the part of the Commission, it represented only one
part of a larger Commission effort that covered every theater of the war and the war dead of
every member of the Empire. This may have simply been one battle the Commission saw as
unnecessary when it could make use of a religiously acceptable alternative. Work had also begun
on thousands of cemeteries by this point as well as the design and construction of numerous
memorials with a limited budget and only so many workers to devote to these efforts. Despite
this, failing to ensure the proper cremation of Indian soldiers who had fought and died for the
British Empire shows a significant failing on the part of the Commission.
In Mesopotamia, far more practical reasons limited cremations efforts. Even during the
war, the British and Indian armies found firewood so scarce in this theatre that it needed to be
supplied directly from India. 124 After the end of the war firewood remained scarce, and the
Commission even considered fuel oil as a replacement. 125 As noted by the Commission in its
discussions of French laws in Europe, reinterment is acceptable to Hindus when necessary, but is
far from the preferred way to dispose of their remains. It is also obvious that if the British
Empire wanted to provide enough fuel to cremate Indian remains in Mesopotamia, it possessed
the ability to do so.
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While the Commission finalized its policies in France, it also began reviewing its burial
policies regarding the Middle Eastern theaters of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Palestine. Far from
the relatively stable and organized conditions on the Western Front, these theaters saw far more
mobile offensives and retreats. This lead to the dead being buried along long routes of advance
and retreat with many soldiers resting in isolated, unmarked, or even unrecorded graves. By
April of 1918, the General Officer Commanding in Chief Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force met
with The Honorable Sir Umar Hayat Khan Malik during his visit to Mesopotamia. A Muslim
Rajput, distinguished military officer, powerful landowner in Punjab, and Honorary aide-decamp to George V, Malik’s opinions carried considerable weight with the military, monarch, and
both the British and Indian governments. 126 Following a discussion regarding registering Indian
Graves, the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India, Simla, received a memorandum containing
policy recommendations based on Malik’s input. This memorandum contained an order that the
Graves Registration Units should confine their efforts to British graves only. It also noted that
“the great majority” of Indian graves remained unmarked, the lack of attempts to register
cremated sepoys, and the fact that erecting headstones on unmarked graves proved impossible to
accomplish. It even deemed the erection of headstones on registered graves as unnecessary. It
then recommended that building a central memorial, preferably at Baghdad, as the best option to
represent Indian religious and caste “sensibilities.” 127
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Following these recommendations, the Commission began a review process to finalize
policies regarding Indian graves. It designated Major R. J. Hilson of the Indian Army as the man
responsible for leading this review and compiling reports on the matter. As early as 1908 then
Captain Hilson served with the 91st Punjabis Light Infantry 128 and by 1916 he became a Double
Company Commander 129 holding the rank of Major. 130 With a long career in the Indian Army
and personal combat experience in Mesopotamia and Palestine, Major Hilson possessed an
intimate perspective on the issues at hand. In a report dated 7 July, 1919, Hilson detailed the
policies adopted by the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force. It revealed that all Indian deceased
in the theatre had been buried save for those who died at the main British base at Basra. The
availability of firewood here made it the only location in the entire theater where cremations
could be carried out. The very nature of the terrain that Indian Expeditionary Force D fought in
made the most basic of Hindu burial rites nearly impossible. The Commission hoped though that
in the future when firewood and fuel oil became more available, that more cremations could be
conducted. It also noted that although no demand for the return of ashes to soldier’s families in
India existed at the time, if this became more desirable in the future then efforts could be made to
make this possible. While the Indian and British Armies buried many sepoys in isolated graves,
numerous cemeteries of varying sizes in Mesopotamia contained the remains of Indian soldiers.
Surrounded by barbed wire, these cemeteries contained separate plots for Muslims and Hindus
with graves being marked with wooden boards showing the deceased’s name and regiment. Both
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armies buried Christian dead in separate Christian cemeteries. This report made it very clear that
exhumation and reinterment of Indian remains “is not taking place and is not contemplated.” 131
The decision to concentrate all oversight of graves in Mesopotamia with individual Post
Commandants also produced a significant effect upon the memories of India’s dead in the
theater. The Commission gave these commandants responsibility for the maintenance of all
graves and cemeteries within their districts as well as their registration. In line with Sir Umar
Hayat Khan Malik’s recommendation that the Graves Registration Units confine their activities
to British graves, these post commandants never forwarded the casualty and burial reports they
compiled to the Graves Registration Units. This meant that these units never possessed any
records of Indian burials in Mesopotamia. The impact of this decision upon the design of future
memorials to the theater’s war dead proved to be significant. A report from the Inspector of
Works in Iraq from 1922 shows just how bad the problem with records became; it noted that
only in Baghdad could the names of the occupants of Indian graves be found. Out of 25,000
dead, the Commission planned only 5,000 marked graves in Iraq. Recovering the names of the
dead required the Commission to search through hospital registers, mostly missing following the
war, or by requesting these records from India. 132 This decision not to forward records to the
Graves Registration Units is made particularly problematic because Hilson’s report supports
Malik’s recommendation for a central memorial as well as a suggestion that in certain tracts
isolated and grouped graves should be obliterated and no trace left. The reasons behind this
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suggestion is not made clear, but it is directly stated that this action should be taken “irrespective
of whether the graves were British or Indian and whether the bodies had been identified or
not.” 133 Eventually, the War Department approved a policy of leaving these graves alone “under
existing local circumstances,” 134 but the suggestion for their obliteration shows just how
complicated the management of graves in Mesopotamia became. The fact that the Commission
made both British and Indian graves subject to this policy also shows that, at least in this
instance, it made no distinctions when it came to the importance of one group over the over.
Although the physical treatment of remains dominated the Commission’s efforts, it also
took the language of memorialization very seriously. This language revolved around the
numerous inscriptions that adorn cemetery gates, memorials, and the headstones of individual
soldiers. The Commission viewed the creation of these inscriptions as a crucial element in its
vision for the cemeteries and monuments it planned. For this reason the Commission turned to
Rudyard Kipling, one of Britain’s most famous writers and proponents of Empire, to write these
inscriptions. Born in Bombay and splitting his childhood between India and Britain, Kipling
possessed a uniquely imperial, and an Anglo-Indian, worldview that was reflected in his
literature. In the decades leading up to the First World War works such as The Jungle Book, Kim,
and “Gunga Din” became iconic works of imperial literature and led to Kipling being awarded
the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1907. 135 Although his professional accomplishments and Anglo-
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Indian background made him an obvious choice for this work, something even more personal
made him the perfect writer to form the language for the Commission’s memorialization efforts.
When the British military rejected Kipling’s son John for service in the war, Kipling used his
personal connections to have him accepted into the Irish Guards. Two days into the Battle of
Loos, John went Missing in Action and his grave has never been identified with certainty. The
loss of his son not only inspired Kipling to work with the IWGC, but also made his work very
personal. 136
When the Commission began designing its memorials and headstones for the British and
Indian dead of the Mesopotamian Campaign, Kipling’s background became even more relevant.
When approached for an inscription to be used for the Commission’s cemeteries and memorials
in Iraq, Kipling returned an eloquent submission. It read: “To the memory of brave men: Here
have been reverently (returned) given to the earth or the fire as their creeds enjoined, the mortal
remains of Indian soldiers who fell during operations in 19 - 19 .” While at first seeming to be a
sensitive dedication for the final resting place of India’s soldiers, the Commission still expressed
reservations about its use. While it agreed that the inscription could be suitable in cemeteries that
only contained the remains of Hindus and Sikhs, in cemeteries that also contained Muslim graves
it found this inscription to be problematic. The phrase “here have been” incorrectly suggested
that Hindu cremations and Muslim burials occurred in the same place. The Commission noted
that this language created the appearance of a “very undesirable arrangement.” 137 In the end it
chose a more secular and basic inscription: “Here are honored men of the Indian Army who gave
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their lives in the Great War for their King and Country. Iraq 1914-1921.” 138 Kipling himself
noted that this inscription “eliminate[d] all references to creed and caste and I can think of no
other way around.” 139
The effect of India’s complex combination of religions and castes created a significant
impact upon the Commission’s work. The almost universal Christian faith of British and
Dominion war dead left the Commission free to be as poetic as it wished within the traditional
Christian themes of death and commemoration. As long as inscriptions and designs remained
respectful and fit into the Commission’s vision of a monument to the Empire and its war dead,
there existed no major concerns over causing offense. The various religions and castes of India’s
war dead worked to complicate this process and risked causing offense with nearly every aspect
of the commemoration process if not handled correctly. Kipling’s original inscription sought to
address this issue by directly stating that “Here have been reverently (returned) given to the earth
or the fire as their creeds enjoined.” Far from ignorant of Indian religions, Kipling likely sought
to highlight the diversity of Indian soldiers in this inscription, but the Commission immediately
saw a risk of causing offense. In order to avoid this at all costs, Kipling simplified his inscription
down into its most basic form. The poetic references to cremation, burial, and the creeds they
represented disappeared. Instead, the creed of “King and Country” took their place. In changing
Kipling’s inscriptions to avoid offense, the Commission also brought them more in line with
their vision of monuments to Empire. The Commission even questioned this wording, though,
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and the Director of Works asked if the term “King” was even applicable to Indians in a letter
proposing a simple change to the inscription. 140 As George V technically held the title King of
the United Kingdom and Emperor of India, this proved to be a valid criticism, but “King and
Country” was far too ingrained into the British psyche to be changed. This resulted in the
Commission making these inscriptions far more British in character than Indian. Even though the
Commission demonstrated a great respect for the Empire’s war dead, the Empire still belonged
to Britain.
Although the shifting sands of Mesopotamia threatened to bury isolated and neglected
graves, in France and Belgium a very different concern presented itself to the Commission.
Although the war ravaged large stretches of French and Belgian countryside, once it ended
farmers were certain to return to their fields and begin work to reclaim the land that the war
destroyed. As early as February of 1918, Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan and the Commission
began discussing plans to exhume the remains of soldiers in scattered graves and reconcentrate
them into the vast cemeteries that became the most visible part of its memorialization efforts.
While Christianity posed no real obstacle to this plan, the graves of Muslim soldiers who served
with the Indian Army caused concern at the Commission. As Islam forbids the exhumation of
remains, the Commission considered allowing Muslim graves with little risk of being disturbed
to be improved with pucca mounds and tablets and left in place. Sir Frederic Kenyon suggested
that “the time will come when this area will be given back to cultivation” and that “if there be
any risk of these graves being removed or ploughed up at any time in the future it is better that
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the remains buried therein may be removed now to the proposed Muslim cemetery” and reburied
under the supervision of an Imam from a local mosque. 141
The idea of separate cemeteries for Muslims seems to be counter to the Commission's
vision of unified monuments to the Empire and its war dead. As with the inscriptions for
headstones and graveyards, the diverse religious backgrounds of Indian soldiers only worked to
complicate matters. A conference between the Indian Graves Committee and the India Office in
July of 1920 decided that “the Indian fallen should be commemorated on the same level and in
the same way...as the British and those from the Dominions.” Equality of commemoration
seemed to not mean unified commemoration though, and the same meeting decided that at any
place “where 30 or more Indian soldiers are buried in one cemetery their graves should lie in a
separate plot within the cemetery wall marked off by a low hedge from the rest.” The further
complexity of Indian languages added to the separations between how the Commission
commemorated Indian soldiers. The minutes from the July meeting noted that “the chances of
error accompanying the recording of a large number of different Arabic or Urdu inscriptions, are
almost endless.” Because of this, it suggested that a separate “Stone of Remembrance” with
Arabic inscriptions be included in plots with Muslim graves, and that this allowed for Muslim
headstones to be inscribed in English. English inscriptions also solved another problem for the
Commission. Although the Commission strove to build monuments to the Empire and its war
dead, this did not mean that it viewed the entire Empire as its audience. It viewed English as
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preferable because of the fact that “the vast majority of visitors to the cemeteries are unlikely to
be able to read anything else.” 142
In 1921, The Commission laid out guidelines for the treatment of Muslim and Hindu
graves in Egypt and Mesopotamia under the direction of General Percy Cox, a distinguished
British Indian Army officer who served during the Mesopotamian Campaign and future High
Commissioner of Iraq. While some of these guidelines were general in nature, such as forbidding
the removal of bodies from Muslim graves, most concerned the placement of remains within
cemeteries. Plots with Muslim graves should have the names of all those buried there inscribed
on a plaque, or, if no names are known, then a simple inscription reading “NUMBER
Mussulman Soldiers of the Indian Army are buried here.” Even though only applying to Indian
Muslims, the Commission still inscribed this message in English. The Commission also required
that Muslim plots have their own entrance that did not require visitors to pass through Christian
or Hindu plots. Almost the opposite of policies for Muslims, the guidelines for Hindu graves
required that when positively identified, these remains should be exhumed, cremated, and buried
at sea. These guidelines also stated that when possible, units returning to India should be given
the chance to take the ashes of the fallen back with them. The cremation site would then be
commemorated with a plaque reading “The following soldiers of the Indian Army fell near this
spot” followed by a list of names. If no known names existed, then the number of cremations
should be listed instead. The Commission also planned for these inscriptions to be inscribed
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solely in English. With the fragmented nature of casualty rolls in Mesopotamia, it is likely that
most of these plaques completely lacked names. 143
The Commission also discussed the matter of burials at sea during this period. The
approval for burials at sea represented a rare case of the soldiers of the Indian Army themselves
influencing Commission policy. In August of 1921 a group of Hindu officers serving in
Constantinople requested that the ashes of Hindus buried at the Osmaniah and Mashlak
cemeteries in Iraq “be cast into the sea.” 144 After receiving letters of support from the Indian
Army and finding that such action incurred no additional costs, the Commission approved the
proposal with Hindu officers overseeing the ceremony. 145 The Commission then extended this
policy to other theaters where Hindus served. At Gallipoli, the Commission exhumed 147 Hindu
soldiers, cremated them, and reburied the ashes at sea. 146 Problems maintaining accurate records
persisted as well and when the Commission found the isolated graves of Sepoys Bhagwan Singh
and Narayan Singh to be empty, it concluded that they had in fact been reburied at sea and the
records never corrected to reflect this. 147 Although the Commission resolved this discrepancy, it
is still representative of a widespread issue of obtaining accurate casualty and burial records
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following the war. This issue eventually had a profound effect on the Commission’s memorials
to India’s war dead.
Although the soldiers of the Indian Army fought in nearly every theatre of the war, the
Western Front in Europe and the sands of Mesopotamia overshadowed all others in their scale
and cost. These theatres also created a division in this experience. Indian soldiers in Europe
could not help but express their admiration for England and France while at the same time
lamenting the stagnant nature of trench warfare and the utter brutality that defined the offensives
it created. Their only reprieves came with the freezing winters that halted major offensives and
pushed the sepoys to the limits of their endurance. Those who served in Mesopotamia found
themselves in a largely barren environment where heat and disease combined to kill more
soldiers than the war itself. Far from the stagnation of the trenches, they found themselves
constantly on the offensive with nothing between them and the enemy but mirages and faith.
Despite this, they largely won their own victories, shared with the units of the British Army who
fought alongside them. In Europe, the Indian Army existed as just one part of a massive war
effort alongside the British, French, and units from almost every British Dominion. As part of
this massive force they obtained only partial victories at Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, and The
Somme. In Mesopotamia the Indian Army secured the Anglo-Persian Company’s oilfields,
gained control of both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and finally captured Baghdad. It also
suffered one of the greatest Allied defeats of the war at Kut al Amara. Despite the victories and
defeats of the Mesopotamian campaign, it is still overshadowed by the memory of the Western
Front.
A division also appeared in the way the IWGC commemorated these soldiers. In Europe,
the British and French governments closely controlled the war effort with the Commission and
66

its Graves Registration Units keeping detailed records of all burials. These units regularly located
isolated graves and detailed efforts went into identifying the remains of any unknown soldier
they found. The Commission directly supervised the meticulous planning of cemeteries and the
intricacies of French Law became the most controversial issue encountered. In Mesopotamia, far
from their governments and under the control of an Expeditionary Army, poorly kept records
soon became even more fragmented. The vast majority of Indian soldiers who died in this theater
remained buried in isolated and unmarked graves that could be impossible to find without
detailed records. The fragmented control of post commandants often left burials in cemeteries
poorly maintained and surrounded by barbed wire.
This division between the treatment of Indian graves in Europe and Mesopotamia can
best be illustrated by their status in the post-war years. When it began its memorialization efforts
in the 1920s, the Commission began inspection tours of known grave sites in all theaters in order
to document the condition of graves and gather information used for planning larger cemeteries
and memorials. The reports these tours produced shows a significant difference between how the
Commission and local populations treated the graves of these two groups of soldiers and the
respect shown to them in the years following the war. In Europe one inspection report written by
Colonel B. C. Penton noted that “The cemeteries are most beautifully laid out and maintained”
and that “I have no doubt in saying that the parents of these Indian soldiers, who gave their lives
in the Great War in France and Belgium, may rest assured that nothing has been left undone to
ensure that their sons [sic] rest in a manner commensurate with the sacrifice they made in the
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cause of the Empire.”
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Not only did these reports praise the condition of these cemeteries, they

also noted that only the issues of simple upkeep on headstones and correcting inscriptions of
soldier’s names needed to be resolved. 149 These cemeteries are still meticulously maintained by
the Commission.
Inspection tours of cemeteries in Mesopotamia during the 1950’s show a far different fate
for the graves of Indian soldiers who died during the war. The reports of these tours show that an
act of desecration, following the end of the occupation and the withdrawal of British troops, at
the Osmanieh Cemetery left headstones broken on the top edge, and that “[t]he marble panels [of
the monument] had been sprayed point blank with a shot gun [sic] in the same act of desecration
in which the headstones were damaged.” Far from being isolated events, an inspection of the
cemetery at Mashlak also found smashed headstones and shotgun damage to the cemetery
memorial. A local brickworks also encroached on the cemetery grounds and used land near
graves to dry bricks in the sun. These reports also mentioned that the local caretaker for the
cemetery was “far from satisfactory.” 150
The global nature of the First World War and the diversity of the British Imperial soldiers
who served in it worked to create a clear division between the Indian experiences on the Western
Front and in Mesopotamia. It also planted the seeds that led to a division in the commemoration
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of India’s war dead and the curation of their final resting places. The Commission’s cemeteries
represented only one part of its commemoration efforts though and in the post war years it also
planned, designed, and constructed large memorials as well. Many of these memorials included
Indian soldiers, but only a select few focused entirely on their memory.
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THE BUILDING OF MEMORY: THE COST OF DISTANCE AND DISORDER

“He who dies on the field of battle,
His name never dies, but lives in history”
- Dafadar Nathan Singh, 2nd Lancers, France, 1916 151

While the Commission struggled to make order out of the aftermath of the war, it also
began planning the grand memorials it envisioned as the centerpiece of its memorialization
efforts. While the cemeteries that contained the individual graves of the Empire’s war dead
followed an orderly and practical design, these monuments allowed the Commission to carefully
design the true monuments to Empire it always envisioned. Often inscribed with the names of
thousands of the Empire’s missing soldiers, these memorials are often less about the individual
soldier and more about fulfilling the Commission’s vision to symbolize the strength and unity of
the British Empire. Although India’s war dead are represented at many of these sites, the
memorials at Neuve Chapelle and Basra are the primary memorials to India’s contribution to the
war. The location of Neuve Chapelle in France and Basra in Mesopotamia also directly
represented the division in Indian war experiences between the two theaters. By analyzing the
Commission’s planning and design process for these memorials, the ultimate impact of the
division between Europe and Mesopotamia on the physical memory of India’s war experience
can be revealed.
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The memorials built by the Imperial War Graves Commission following the war served
not only as visual representations of the unity of the British Empire, but also as the primary
memorials for all of the British and Imperial soldiers with no known graves. For those soldiers
whose remains could be found and identified, extensive efforts went into making sure they
received proper burials or cremations. Memorializing the missing of war, however, especially on
such a massive scale as created by the First World War, represented a completely new challenge
to the governments involved in the conflict. More than any other conflict before it, the sheer
number of soldiers who disappeared into the chaos of war defined World War I, and the Imperial
War Graves Commission needed to decide how these missing soldiers should be commemorated.
With no remains available for burial, only the names of the missing could be used for these
memorialization efforts. These names, listed in the thousands on memorials and cemetery walls,
became the lasting legacy of the Empire’s missing soldiers.
The Commission’s discussions of memorials to Indian soldiers began as early as 1918
when the Indian Graves Committee passed Resolution No. 4 during a meeting on March 20 at
the India Office. Attended by Under Secretary of State for India, The Lord Islington, High
Commissioner for the Union of South Africa W. P. Schreiner, Sahibzada Aftab Khan, and Sir
Prabhashankar D. Pattani, this meeting focused on the treatment of Indian graves and cremations.
Concerned about the lack of progress towards the creation of Indian memorials, the Indian
Graves Committee passed Resolution No. 4 at this meeting, recommending that Sir Edwin
Lutyens and Herbert Baker be instructed “to draw up a design for both a Mosque and Temple,
with due regard to the requirements of the respective faiths … and that these buildings should
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serve as central memorials to all Indians who had fallen in France and Belgium.” 152 Not only did
Lutyens and Baker have an existing relationship with the Commission, they remain today as
icons of Imperial architecture. Sir Edwin Lutyens became a highly successful English architect
before becoming the central figure in designing the new capital of the British Raj at New Delhi.
Not only did he design many of the monumental government buildings in New Delhi, he also
went on to design the IWGC’s Thiepval Memorial for the Somme as well as the India Gate
memorial for the Indian government. He also designed The Cenotaph, London’s most notable
memorial to the war - a design that was replicated across the Empire. Herbert Baker also began
as a prominent English architect before becoming involved in extensive building projects in
South Africa. He then joined Lutyens in a contentious partnership to design New Delhi as well as
designing the Delville Wood and Loos memorials for the Commission. 153 Lutyens and Baker not
only became icons of Imperial architecture, together they defined the contemporary style of
Indian government buildings.
Although Resolution No. 4 represented an important step towards the memorialization of
India’s fallen soldiers, nearly five months after its passing no progress had been made in actually
beginning work on these plans. Hoping to reassure the Indian representatives of the Imperial War
Conference that these plans had not been forgotten, Director Ware sent a representative to
discuss the matter with General Sir Percy Cox at the India Office. A distinguished British Indian
Army officer who served during the Mesopotamian Campaign and as the High Commissioner of
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Iraq, General Cox held immense influence within the India Office. This representative explained
to General Cox that Director Ware and the Commission were working on the issue of Indian
memorials and that their consent needed be obtained before any serious action could be taken. As
an intermediate measure, the Commission suggested that Resolution No. 4 be enacted with
Lutyens and Baker placed under the supervision of Sir Frederic Kenyon, former director of the
British Museum and official Advisor to the IWGC on matters of memorial and cemetery
design. 154 General Cox strongly suggested that the memorial Temple and Mosque be built near
Estaires and that rough sketches should be drawn up as soon as possible. Once received, these
sketches then returned to India with the representatives from the Imperial War Conference for
further approval. 155
This suggestion began a lengthy discussion within the Commission over the practical and
religious difficulties of using places of worship as war memorials. The Commission considered
its memorialization efforts for British and Dominion soldiers as essentially Christian in nature
since their earliest conception. One significant argument that highlights this is the competition
between Lutyens and Baker for the central memorial to be placed in the Commission’s
cemeteries. While Baker proposed a “Cross of Lorraine” to symbolize both France and
Christianity, Lutyens designed a non-religious “Stone of Remembrance” with an appropriate
inscription carved onto it. 156 Commenting on the notion that some type of cross may not be
chosen, Sir Frederic Kenyon argued that “I have no doubt that great distress would be felt if our
cemeteries lacked the recognition of the fact that we are a Christian Empire, and this symbol of
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self-sacrifice made by those who lie in them.” 157 Although the Commission stated a commitment
to equality in its memorialization efforts, Kenyon’s view of a “Christian Empire” again shows a
British preference for Christianity. In this respect it is not unusual that religious designs
dominated the first concepts the Commission proposed for Indian memorials. Just as with
Rudyard Kipling’s inscriptions for Indian graves, however, the longer the Commission discussed
these ideas, the more apparent it became that Indian religions caused complications both
practical and religious. Even from the beginning J. E. Talbot, a Principal Assistant Secretary at
the Commission, took these difficulties under consideration and wrote to Sir Edwin Lutyens
suggesting he consult an “Indian expert” for help designing the memorial Mosque. He
recommended none other than Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan, the long serving Muslim
representative on the Indian Graves Committee and one of the primary proponents behind
Resolution No. 4. 158
For his design of a memorial Hindu Temple the Commissioned paired Herbert Baker
with Sir Prabhashankar Pattani, the Indian Graves Committee’s Hindu representative and fellow
proponent of Resolution No. 4. Pattani almost immediately cautioned Baker that a Memorial
Shrine should be designed and not an actual Temple. This shrine’s design copied those of
Chaityas, traditional structures erected over the cremation grounds of Rajahs and later used as
prayer halls and shrines. He also highlighted the design difficulties caused by the large number
of Hindu sects that exist and the unique images and symbols used by each. Although cautionary
about the use of a Hindu Temple, Pattani showed enthusiasm about the inclusion of Buddhist
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architectural styles due to their absorption into Hindu designs over the years and even suggested
the use of an “Ashoka Column” bearing the memorial’s inscription. For the interior of the Shrine
he recommended that sculptures or a frieze showing the various types of Indian soldiers who
fought in the war should be included while the names of the fallen should be inscribed upon the
interior walls. Pattani also recommended smaller shrines for use in large, central cemeteries
containing Indian graves because Muslim graves could not be moved and memorial Shrines and
Mosques should always appear “side by side.” Despite the depth of Pattani’s suggestions, Baker
noted that no further progress on the design could be made until the Commission chose a
location and the designs of the Muslim and Christian memorials could be coordinated with his
own work. 159
Although preliminary plans for the memorial Shrine and Mosque existed since 1918, the
IWGC only made a formal presentation of these plans to the Indian government through General
Sir Herbert Cox in late 1919. 160 The next February, General Cox, Sir Edwin Lutyens, Sir Herbert
Baker, and Major General Sir A. H. Bingley, the Secretary to the Government of India, Army
Department, discussed these plans at a meeting in New Delhi. Following this meeting, Major
General Bingley compiled a memorandum discussing its conclusions and recommendations. He
noted that the attendees of the meeting unanimously agreed that the plans for the memorial
Mosque and Temple were lavish in scale and likely to be overly costly to erect. These concerns
over cost proved to be so significant the attendees determined that if the British government or
public financed these plans, then they were at least feasible, but if the burden of finance fell upon
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the Indian government they deemed it unlikely that the necessary funds could be found. 161 The
fact that the colonial government in India made contributions to the war effort valued at over 479
million Pounds, a sum greater than all foreign investment in India from 1850 to 1910, meant that
it did not have sufficient funds available for these projects. In order to support the war India
essentially halted a significant portion of its own economic development. 162 The British
Dominions found themselves in a far stronger economic position following the war and could
afford significant expenditures for war memorials. Following the war Canada allocated nearly $1
million for these projects and Australia spent £100,000 on the memorial at Villers-Bretonneux
alone. For the monument at Neuve Chapelle the Indian government could only contribute
£10,000. 163 Simply trying to make up for this economic loss following the war, little money
could be spared for war memorials thousands of miles away.
As the process of trying to approve these plans continued, a meeting between the
Imperial War Graves Commission and the India Office occurred on July 27, 1920 which
discussed the subject of the memorial Temple and Mosque. The difficulties already brought to
light in the construction of these memorials dominated this discussion. Not only did both parties
agree that these plans should be abandoned on the basis of cost, they also insisted that “the
Indian fallen should be commemorated on the same level and in the same way, Mutatis
Mutandis, 164 as the British and those from the Dominions.” This meant using “Stones of
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Remembrance,” cenotaphs, or obelisks in the place occupied by the Cross of Sacrifice in
Christian cemeteries. The Commission also directed that all Indian soldiers who fell in France
should be entered into cemetery registers and that all cremated Hindus should have their names
inscribed on cemetery walls or other locations “in the same way as British and other soldiers
whose bodies are not recovered.” It is unclear if the Commission intended this as an actual
attempt to uphold equality or simply as a way of justifying canceling the plans for these
memorials, but the result represented a significant reduction in cost and an almost complete
elimination of religious complications. 165 Although the Commission considered respect for all of
the Empire’s war dead and their religions as its ultimate priority, the reality of paying for these
memorialization efforts eventually limited what it could actually accomplish.
As the Commission’s plans for these memorials became widely known, the Indian
government and communities from across the Empire began voicing their opinions. During this
time Sikhs living in the Saragodha 166 district of India sent a letter to Khalsa Diwan, Secretary
Chief of the Sikh Deputation in London. This letter requested that if plans for a memorial
Temple and Mosque went ahead, then a Sikh Gurdwara should also be constructed. 167 The Sikh
Deputation in London took this letter seriously enough that they forwarded it directly to the
office of the Secretary of State for India and then on to the IWGC in the hope that “no invidious
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distinction to the prejudice of the Sikh community is made in this matter.” 168 Other communities
from the Empire joined the Sikhs in requesting a separate memorial during this period and soon
the Gurkha community made a similar request. Although primarily followers of the Hindu
religion, Gurkhas are a distinct group of soldiers recruited from Nepal and serving in the Indian
Army. For this reason, they requested their own unique memorial “which would disassociate
them from their Indian co-religionists.” With the plans for the Temple and Mosque already being
criticized for their cost, the addition of two more temples to the plan made it almost impossible
to justify the expenditure. The Commission also found it unlikely that the French government
would authorize the construction of religious memorials in the shape of a Mosque and Shrine. It
instead recommended that a Cenotaph of an appropriate design be erected as a central memorial
in cemeteries containing Indian graves to compliment the “Cross of Remembrance” used in
Christian cemeteries. The Cenotaphs would then be supplemented where appropriate by “Stones
of Remembrance” bearing inscriptions in the language of those troops buried in the cemetery. 169
The Commission’s plans for memorial places of worship also received at least some
criticism from within the British government itself. Lord Hugh Cecil, a Member of Parliament
for Oxford University, son of former Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, and a strong advocate for
Anglican values in the British government, objected to these plans. 170 During the war, Cecil also
served as a member of the Mesopotamia Commission of Inquiry, a government body charged
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with investigating the troubled campaigns at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia itself. 171 When Cecil
became aware of the Commission’s plans for a memorial Temple and Mosque he began a
correspondence with Sir Frederic Kenyon in which he strongly voiced his criticisms of these
plans. Not only did Cecil object to the fact that these memorials would be places of worship, he
also objected to their funding by British Christians through subscription. Although his personal
faith undoubtedly contributed to these objections, his time on the Mesopotamia Commission of
Inquiry left him intimately familiar with the sacrifices of the Indian Army in Mesopotamia. This
makes his objection to voluntary subscription of these memorials by British citizens less
understandable. Whether reasonable or not, the IWGC almost immediately repudiated these
objections. In a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Arthur Browne, Principal Assistant Secretary
for the Commission in March of 1920, G. M. Young relayed the opinions of General Cobbe on
Cecil’s criticisms. General Cobbe pointed out that Sir Frederic Kenyon had already confirmed
that the Indian government agreed to “paying their share of the expenses of the whole scheme.”
He also rejected the claim that either the Mosque or Temple memorials served as actual places of
worship due to the fact that “[n]either of them is to be dedicated, the Hindu building is
specifically to contain no idol or shrine, and of course there is no question of the Muhammadan
[sic] building containing either of these things. Neither building will have a priest or Mullah
attached to it.” In fact, General Cobbe argued that these buildings merely made use of
architectural styles drawn from Hindu and Muslim religious buildings and melded them into the
form of a war memorial. He also pointed out the hypocrisy of such criticism. “[I]t would be as
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reasonable to object to the use of Gothic architecture in a secular building, and far more
reasonable to demur on religious grounds to the pagan style of half the churches in London, as to
grudge the Hindu and Muhammadan soldiers of the crown a memorial in consonance with their
architectural traditions.” General Cobbe also suggested that his views be relayed to Kenyon
himself “in case Lord H. Cecil renews his correspondence with him on the subject.” 172 Even
though the Commission and Indian government criticized these memorials on practical grounds,
they quickly defended them from religious bias and came to the defense of the architects
designing them
The longer the Commission discussed the plans for memorial places of worship, the more
complicated and expensive they became. With the Sikh and Gurkha communities also requesting
their own unique memorials the Commission realized that these plans were simply impractical.
By September of 1920, the Commission passed a resolution ending all plans for the memorial
Shrine and Mosque and made the use of obelisks and “Stones of Remembrance” in cemeteries
the official policy of the IWGC. This policy solved almost all of the complications of the larger
memorials including cost and religious considerations. Once again, the IWGC began
memorialization efforts with a plan that put India’s religious diversity at the forefront, this time
in the form of a Temple and Mosque. Yet once again, the complexity of these religions and the
countless ways that oversights could cause offense forced the Commission to water down its
plans to simpler, smaller monuments. Only inscriptions for Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs on the
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Stones of Remembrance remained as acknowledgements of diversity. The inscriptions on
obelisks remained in English only. 173
While the Commission debated its plans for a memorial Temple and Mosque in France,
the Indian government planned to create its own memorials for the nation’s war dead. The
centerpiece of these plans was a large central memorial in Delhi with commemorative tablets
placed in villages across India that supplied large numbers of recruits to the war effort, an
estimated 500 such villages received these tablets. 174 Obelisks listing the Indian and British units
who served in the Indian Army would then be placed in the five theaters of the war: France and
Belgium, Egypt and Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, and East Africa. The Indian government
planned to fully fund these memorials with an estimated cost of £2,500-£3,000 each. 175 The
plans for Indian memorials following the war even attracted the attention of Buckingham Palace
and Clive Wigram, 1st Baron Wigram and Private Secretary to King George V, wrote to the
India Office in early 1920 asking that he be kept apprised of any such plans so that they might be
passed along to the King. 176 The most significant of these memorials built by the Indian
government is the All-India War Memorial, later known as the India Gate, a massive arch meant
to commemorate all of the Indian soldiers who died during the war. Designed by Sir Edwin
Lutyens and standing 138 feet tall, this monument took nearly nine years to build. 177 Originally
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conceived to honor the dead from a war of Empire, the Gate eventually became a symbol of
India itself and played central roles in Republic Day celebrations following independence. 178
Although the Indian government wanted to build its own memorials in each theater of the
war, the form of these memorials caused a conflict that eventually ended these plans. They
originally intended for these memorials to take the form of “Battle Exploit Memorials” (BEMs)
to commemorate the units who fought in certain locations and the victories they achieved.
Instead of directly honoring the dead and missing of the war, these memorials marked the
military victories of every Indian soldier who fought in the theater. Within Britain itself, plans
for a large number of Battle Exploit Memorials caused their own conflict. Under the control of
the National Battlefields Memorial Committee, these plans envisioned a string of such
memorials along the lines held by the British during the war. When it became known that the
IWGC also planned its own “Memorials to the Missing,” however, the two organizations began
discussions on how to coordinate their efforts. Not wanting to dilute the importance of these
efforts by building duplicate memorials across the Western Front, the NBMC scrapped its plans
in favor of those of the IWGC. With this decision, almost all of Britain’s Great War memorials
came completely under the control of the IWGC. 179 For the time being, however, the Dominions
and the Indian government still retained final say over their own memorialization efforts.
Despite retaining this final say, India’s own plans for BEMs eventually caused a conflict
that solidified IWGC control over most Indian memorials outside of the subcontinent as well.
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Although the Menin Gate Memorial commemorated the Indian dead and missing from Ypres and
The Salient, over 4,500 missing Indian soldiers from across the Western Front still needed a
memorial. The Commission considered this a sufficient number to justify the building of an
entire memorial devoted solely to their memory and offered to dedicate one of its already
planned memorials on the Western Front entirely to India’s missing soldiers. If the Indian
government agreed to this course of action, then the Commission could fully fund the project
with India’s contribution to the IWGC budget already covering its share. If the Indian
government continued with its plans for Battle Exploit Memorials, then the names of India’s
missing could be included on appropriate British memorials with no distinct Indian memorial
made in order to avoid duplicate memorials. As the Commission’s charter did not allow it to
fund or build Battle Exploit Memorials, India would have to fully fund these projects itself.
Although the final decision lay with the Indian government, its financial difficulties following
the war led the Commission to believe that it could not support its own memorial plans and could
be convinced to drop these in favor of the Commission’s proposed Indian memorial. 180 After
some deliberation on the part of the Indian Government, it finally decided to amalgamate its own
plans into those of the Commission and to accept the Commission’s offer of a distinct memorial
to India’s missing on the Western Front. Located near the lines held by the Indian Army at
Neuve Chapelle, the Commission planned for this site to act in spirit as a BEM as well as a
memorial to the missing. 181 Although the Indian Government eventually built a handful of BEMs
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in places like Port Tewfik in Mesopotamia, this decision made the IWGC the primary curator of
the memory of India’s war dead.
The dedication of an entire memorial on the Western Front to India’s missing also helped
to elevate their standing within the memorialization process. This elevation of standing mainly
concerned how the Commission listed the names of the Empire’s missing on memorials such as
the Menin Gate that included names from across the Empire. It took a surprisingly long time for
the Commission to consider how to organize such long and varied lists of missing soldiers. Only
on July 3, 1923 did Herbert Pelisun write to Director Ware regarding how to organize the Order
of Precedence for units listed on memorials. The traditional Order of Precedence for the British
Military was overly complicated at the time and caused many Territorial and Reserve Units to be
listed separately from their Regiments. 182 Based on the Army List of 1917, a register of all units
in the British and Imperial Forces, the suggested revised Order of Precedence placed the Indian
Army at the very bottom below all the Dominions and even the British West Indies Regiment
and the 1st Cape Coloured Labour Battalion. The Commission did note, however, that “the
position of the Indian Army would need to be considered.” 183 By July 10 the Director of Records
consulted with Sir George McDonogh, former Director of Military Intelligence and a
Commissioner at the IWGC. Their revised Order of Precedence placed the Indian Army second
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only to the units of the British Army itself and above all of the Dominions. 184 Far from blindly
sticking to established military tradition, the Commission readily recognized India’s significant
contribution to the war effort and gave its missing soldiers a prominent place on its memorials.
Even with this recognition, India’s missing still existed as merely one part of these mixed
memorials and the monument at Neuve Chapelle therefore acted to highlight India’s contribution
to the war on the Western Front.
The conflict over Battle Exploit Memorials ended by 1923. By this time the IWGC fully
resolved the issues of control over India’s memorial to the Missing on the Western Front and
began the process of its design and construction. The Commission first needed to find an
architect to design the memorial and once again turned to Sir Herbert Baker who quickly
accepted the offer in March of 1923. In order to avoid the design difficulties connected to the
abortive plans for the memorial Temple and Mosque, the Director of Works recommended that
he once again work closely with the India Office in order to work out any religious
complications that might arise. 185 Baker completed his designs by the end of June 1923 and
submitted them to the IWGC for approval. Baker described his design as “based on an open
space enclosed by a pierced stone railing in front and a solid wall at the back, on which the
names of the missing would be inscribed. The enclosure will be entered by a small domed chatri
such is characteristic of the Indian sepulcral [sic] monument, with a similar one opposite the
entrance to be used as a shelter.” In order to avoid religious complications, Baker sought a
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symbol that could represent all Indians and decided on a column in the form used by the
Emperor Ashoka throughout India and topped by a Lotus and a glass bowl filled with water from
the river Ganges, described as “the most sacred symbolic element in India.” He also planned for
the railings surrounding the site to have the Coats of Arms of the provinces and native states of
India carved into them and an existing ditch on the site expanded into a moat around the
monument to represent the trenches that defined the war experience on the Western Front. 186
Little more than a week after Baker submitted his design, the IWGC already found reason
for concern. Writing to General Cobbe at the India Office, Lord Arthur Brown noted Baker’s
hesitantancy to pursue his design further until he could complete a consultation with the India
Office, even going so far as to request the presence of J. H. Marshall, Director General of
Archaeology in India. In the meantime, Browne voiced concerns that the design, although
intended to honor both Muslims and Hindus, “had a tendency to be more Hindu than
Mohammedan in character” with the Ashoka column and bowl of water from the Ganges singled
out as the most prominently Hindu elements. 187 Following the planned meeting with the India
Office the next week, Lord Arthur Browne, Rudyard Kipling, General Sir Alexander Cobbe, and
the Vice-Chairman of the Commission attended a meeting at the IWGC to discuss Baker’s
design. Although the Commission approved Baker’s design, it rejected his idea for a glass bowl
filled with water from the Ganges and replaced it with a simple carved crown taking its place at
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the top of the column. 188 Compared to the plans for a memorial Temple and Mosque, The
Commission encountered relatively few controversies in the design process for the memorial at
Neuve Chapelle and approved the designs in only two weeks versus the almost two full years
spent on the Temple and Mosque.
With the design for the Neuve Chapelle memorial approved, the Commission began
preparing for its construction, but by October of 1923 a new problem presented itself. Monsieur
Sengez, who promised part of his property located at a crossroads in the Commune of
Richebourg-l'Avoué near Neuve Chapelle for the memorial since as early as 1921, retracted his
offer due to issues of inheritance. A Portuguese cemetery already located on land he previously
owned limited his holdings while another suitable site already contained a small monument to a
British Officer erected by the family who owned the property. Other sites proved to be either too
small, owned by more than person, or priced as high as ₣70,000. 189 By December, the
Commission was still unable to find a suitable site for the memorial and although numerous plots
of open land were available, the Commission desired a very specific type of land. This land
should be located within the limits of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and its subsidiary Battle of
Loos, sit on a main road or crossroads if possible, and allow the memorial to face towards the
location of the German lines during the war. Although four sites on crossroads fit this criteria
within the Communes of Richebourg L'Avoue’ and Neuve Chapelle, not one of the owners
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agreed to sell their land. 190 Although the Commission eventually purchased suitable land, the
process of simply finding a place to build their memorial to Indians on the Western Front took
considerable time and effort.
Finally, one of the most important design decisions left to be made for the memorial
concerned how to list the names of the Indian Army’s missing soldiers. Although not as large as
other memorials such as the Menin Gate, the 5,350 191 names the Commission planned to
commemorate on the Neuve Chapelle Memorial still represented a daunting task of organization
and inscription. By mid-1923 the Secretary of State for India reached an agreement with the
Commission on how these names should be organized. All names should be listed by unit with
British officers listed alongside their men. Officers in general then headed each list followed by
NCOs and finally the general ranks. The suggested inscription for the memorial read: “To the
glorious memory of the British Officers, Indian Officers and Men of the Indian Army who died
in France and Belgium during the Great War 1914-1918. The names of those whose resting place
is unknown are recorded below.” In order to represent all the soldiers memorialized at Neuve
Chapelle, and allow any relatives who visited to read the inscription, the Commission planned
for its presentation in English, Urdu, Hindi, and Gurmukhi. 192 During this entire process the
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Commission encountered no serious issues in obtaining accurate lists of the Indian missing and
no controversies arose in connection with how they should be listed.
On October 7, 1927, after almost four years of construction, the IWGC unveiled the
Neuve Chapelle memorial. Representatives from the British, Indian, Dominion, and French
governments attended the ceremony as well as high-ranking military officers from each nation.
Before the ceremony began the Indian contingent inspected the memorial before taking their
assigned positions. The ceremony then began with an opening address by Lieutenant-General Sir
Charles Anderson, a veteran commander in the Indian Army. In this address, Anderson described
the soldiers of the Indian Army as “[m]en of many different races, speaking different languages
and holding different religious beliefs but one and all British and Indian alike bound together by
the tie of loyalty to their King Emperor and determined to uphold the honour and the ideals of
His Empire.” 193 Further speeches by Colonel H. H. the Maharaja of Kapurthala and Maréchal de
France Ferdinand Foch, one of the most celebrated French generals of the war and eventual
Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Europe, then followed. After the address by Maréchal
Foch, British Field Marshall and former Commander-in-Chief for India Sir Claud Jacob invited
The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India to make his address followed
by the formal unveiling of the memorial. The honor guard then played The Last Post, the formal
bugle call used during British military funerals, followed by a minute’s silence. The ceremony
concluded with the Commissioners of the IWGC placing wreaths at the memorial and the
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playing of the French and British national anthems. 194 Far from a small and discreet ceremony,
the unveiling of the Neuve Chapelle memorial was a celebrated event attended by men from the
highest levels of the British, French, and Indian governments and militaries. The attendance by
Maréchal Foch, perhaps the most notable and celebrated officer of the entire war, showed the
high esteem in which the French military held India’s contribution to the defense of France. The
British government itself went even further to show its appreciation. Asked to be made aware of
the progress of the memorials to India’s fallen since their earliest stages, King George V
personally received the twenty-six Indian soldiers and two British Officers who made up the
Indian contingent at the unveiling, each of whom fought during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle.
During a reception at Buckingham Palace on the morning of Saturday, November 7, the King
personally spoke with these soldiers, asking about their service during the war and expressing his
gratitude for their attendance at the unveiling before inviting them to personally inspect the
Royal Palaces at St. James. 195 Although the Memorial at Neuve Chapelle received prominent
attention, not everyone viewed it as a fitting tribute to India’s contribution to the war. In a Letter
to the Editor published in the October 1st, 1927 edition of the The Times, Stanley Rice expressed
concern that the memorial “will mean little or nothing to the Indian Army.” He argued that to
many Indians the war in Europe represented “but a dim memory and to some only an episode of
history” and that “[t]o India the war meant very largely the Mesopotamian campaign.” In light
“of the fact that the Memorial will never be seen by those whom it most nearly concerns,” he
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suggested sending photographs and accounts of the memorial’s significance to the regiments
commemorated on the memorial. 196
Despite Mr. Rice’s concerns, the Commission started considering a memorial for India’s
missing in Mesopotamia at the end of the war with serious planning beginning in 1922. Wanting
to find a meaningful location for this memorial the Commission decided that it should be
constructed at Basra, the site of the initial landings of the Mesopotamian Campaign in 1914. To
design this memorial, meant to commemorate India’s most significant contribution to the war
and the largest number of its dead and missing soldiers, the Commission turned to Edward
Prioleau Warren, a British architect who specialized in designing churches and country homes. 197
Not nearly as successful or influential as Herbert Baker, Warren seems an underwhelming choice
by the Commission to build the most important memorial to India’s sacrifice in the war, even
when his previous experience working on other Commission projects in the region is considered.
Despite lacking the background of Lutyens or Baker, Warren began the design process with
vigor, but became frustrated by the lack of communication from the Commission about what
form the memorial should take. In a letter to Colonel H. F. Robinson of the IWGC in May of
1923, Warren voiced his frustration. “[I]t is regrettable that no indication whatsoever of the type
or form of the building in question was provided me, beyond the request for a design for a
“Building” to commemorate about 13,000 names of the missing in Mesopotamia, with no
particulars of religions or sects to be commemorated, without definition of the position or nature
of the site in view.” Working from his previous experience designing cemeteries and memorials
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to Indian soldiers, Warren designed the memorial “without the slightest intention of conveying
symbolism in any way” and organized it in a cruciform pattern with Christians, Hindus, and
Muslims having equal sections around a central domed structure. Very cognizant of the lack of
direction he received in the design process, Warren eagerly requested a consultation with the
Commission to approve the design before final planning began. 198
This meeting took place in June of 1923 at the India Office and was attended by Lord
Arthur Browne, former Military Secretary to the India Office and member of the Council of
India Sir Edmund Barrow, Colonel Chitty from the IWGC, and Warren himself. Despite being
the first Commission architect to design a memorial to Indian soldiers without including any of
the religious elements that caused such serious complications elsewhere, this meeting proved that
Warren held valid concerns and those in attendance immediately rejected his design for being a
closed structure. They also found the design to be incredibly unattractive with Barrow describing
it as “a fortified caravanserai” and Colonel Chitty noting its “striking resemblance to the local
jail.” Surprisingly, one of the main objections to this design concerned the way that it
encouraged vandalism. Both Colonel Chitty and Lord Arthur Browne voiced concerns “that the
design of the building gave every opportunity for the rival religious sects to desecrate the
portions of the memorial set aside for other religions and that this would undoubtedly happen in
a memorial which was not open to general view.” For the first time in its discussion of
memorials to India’s missing, the Commission addressed the possibility of religious desecration.
Certain that such desecration would eventually occur, the attendees demanded a new, open-form
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design be prepared, but left the details to Warren. 199 In the end, Warren returned an open-formed
design featuring a central obelisk with the names of the missing inscribed on rectangular walls
surrounding the site. Although the Commission approved this design, there still remained one
final issue to be resolved that caused a lasting effect on the memory of the missing of the
Mesopotamian Campaign.
Nearly four years after the Commission made its decisions to decentralize Graves
Registration and record keeping efforts in Mesopotamia, the consequences of this action became
apparent. The Commission estimated that the Basra memorial would list the names of 13,000
British missing and between 25,000 and 40,000 Indians. With the casualty lists for the British
missing mostly complete, the fractured state of Indian records meant that the Commission
required a considerable amount of time to prepare provisional lists of Indian missing. Even if it
completed this process, the Commission estimated that the lists would still “contain only 60-70%
of the names of the dead.” The Commission found the difficulties in compiling accurate lists of
Indian missing so severe that it considered making Basra a memorial only to British missing and
to construct a separate Indian memorial once the issue could be settled. 200
These difficulties in compiling accurate lists of India’s missing in Mesopotamia, so
central to the memorialization process, prompted a discussion within the Commission on how to
handle the issue. Although given enough time, accurate and complete casualty lists may have
been recreated, the Commission wanted to finish work on the memorial as soon as possible. The
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eminent withdrawal of British forces from the region, along with the stability and security they
provided, meant that the Commission felt it could not afford to take months correcting these lists.
Working against this deadline, the Commission made the momentous decision to sidestep the
issue entirely and forgo memorializing most of the Indian Missing by name. 201 In early March of
1924 Lord Arthur Browne wrote to the Under-Secretary of State, Military Department, at the
India Office seeking approval to these changes. This letter suggested the most striking policy
change to the memorialization of India’s Missing. Due to the fact “that the memorials themselves
will in all probability not be seen by any of the relatives of the rank and file, the memorials in
question outside Europe will contain only the names of the regiments concerned, followed in
each case by the names of the British officers (and non-commissioned officers if any), the names
of the Indian officers and the number of the native non-commissioned officers and men.” Faced
with inaccurate records and little time to correct them, the Commission decided to simply
remove the names of India’s missing rank and file from the memorialization process outside of
Europe. This decision was not universal, however, and “[i]n Europe, where the memorials will
be seen by many visitors, and where the numbers of Indian names concerned are not so great, the
British and Indian officers and the Indian rank and file will be commemorated by name.” The
Indian government only demanded that the names of the Indian rank-and-file outside of Europe
should be included in cemetery and memorial registers. 202
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Although practical reasons existed for this decision, it cannot be ignored that the British
government had shown the highest respect for white and British soldiers, while allowing
compromises when it came to the Indian rank and file. Those Indian officers who were lucky
enough to be listed by name undoubtedly belonged to the upper classes and castes of Indian
society so favored by the British. While the difficulty of recreating accurate casualty lists in a
short amount of time was a legitimate concern, deciding not to list Indian soldiers by name
simply because their families would not be able to visit the memorial seems a shallow excuse to
justify sidestepping the issue. Deciding not to list enlisted Indian soldiers by name also directly
contradicted the Commission’s commitment to equality and profoundly impacted the lasting
memory of those Indians who fought and died in Mesopotamia, many forever left in scattered
and undocumented graves. Out of an original estimate of almost 40,000 names from the Indian
Army to be commemorated on the Basra Memorial, only 249 white officers, 50 white NCOs and
enlisted, and 419 Indian officers remained. These 718 names represented less than 2% of the
Indian Army’s missing in Mesopotamia. 203
Despite these changes, the Commission finally unveiled the Basra Memorial at 10 am on
March 27, 1929. 204 Sir Gilbert Clayton, High Commissioner for the British Mandate of
Mesopotamia, presided over the ceremony. The British Consul for Basra Gerald Selous, a Mr.
Peek from the IWGC, 205 Commander Sir John Alleyne of the Royal Navy, and the Mutasarrif of
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the Basra Liwa representing King Faisal of Iraq, also attended the ceremony. 206 A significant
part of the local British and Indian communities also attended the ceremony with the Indian
community represented by Sardar Khan, Secretary of the local Indian Association. 207 The
ceremony opened with Clayton being received by Sir Robert Brooke Popham, the Air Officer
Commanding 208 followed by the Royal Salute and an inspection of the Honor Guard provided by
the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. 209 H.M.S. Lupin also traveled up the Tigris River,
moored near the memorial for the ceremony, and provided sailors for the honor guard. After the
inspection, Sir Gilbert Clayton made a short address in part stating that: “We are here to unveil a
memorial to those whose graves are unknown. It is fitting that this memorial should stand at the
entrance to Iraq where the first expeditionary force entered the country. As we work for the
peace and prosperity of Iraq it is fitting that we should have a reminder of those who gave their
lives for the liberation of the country.” The formal unveiling followed this address accompanied
by a nineteen gun salute from H.M.S. Lupin, a fly over 210 by aircraft from 84 Squadron RAF, 211
and the playing of The Last Post by a formation of RAF buglers. 212 A minute of silence then
followed before the laying of wreaths by Clayton and representatives of the Indian, Australian,

206

G. Peek, Letter to Lord Arthur Browne, March 28th, 1929. Commonwealth War Graves
Commission Archives, Catalogue Number 628, Item WG 219/19 Pt. 2.
207
Staff Writers, “Iraq War Memorial Unveiled: Sir G. Clayton’s First Visit to Basra,” Madras
Mail, April 3, 1929.
208
G. Peek, Letter to Lord Arthur Browne, March 28th, 1929. Commonwealth War Graves
Commission Archives, Catalogue Number 628, Item WG 219/19 Pt. 2.
209
Staff Writers, “Iraq War Memorial Unveiled: Sir G. Clayton’s First Visit to Basra,” Madras
Mail, April 3, 1929.
210
Staff Writers, “Iraq War Memorial Unveiled: Sir G. Clayton’s First Visit to Basra,” Madras
Mail, April 3, 1929.
211
G. Peek, Letter to Lord Arthur Browne, March 28th, 1929. Commonwealth War Graves
Commission Archives, Catalogue Number 628, Item WG 219/19 Pt. 2.
212
Staff Writers, “Iraq War Memorial Unveiled: Sir G. Clayton’s First Visit to Basra,” Madras
Mail, April 3, 1929.
96

and New Zealand governments 213 as well as representatives of Iraq, the Royal Navy, seven
Divisions of the British and Indian Armies that served in the Mesopotamian Campaign, 214 and
the Merchant Navy. 215 After the ceremony ended, Clayton made official visits to H.M.S. Lupin
and Viceroy’s Pier at Basra where he met with city officials. The day finally ended with a garden
party at the British Consulate attended by nearly 300 guests. 216
Although not attended by nearly as prestigious representatives as the unveiling of the
Neuve Chapelle Memorial, the unveiling at Basra was an almost extravagant affair with its naval
salutes, flyovers, and social events. The ceremony only lacked one important element, a
contingent of soldiers from the Indian Army itself. By the time of the unveiling, all Indian Army
units withdrew from Mesopotamia with no arrangements made for their attendance. After nearly
five years spent planning and constructing the memorial at Basra, the memorial to India’s most
important contribution to the war and the over 53,000 missing of the campaign, the Indian Army
was not even present at the unveiling. Neither were the legendary Field Marshals of the war or
the Director of the IWGC, and no one in attendance was received by King George V himself.
Many of these differences are simply due to practical logistics. The end of the war necessitated
the withdrawal of the Indian Army from Mesopotamia and the attendance of prominent
representatives from Europe required weeks of travel.
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While understandable, these differences show the significant ways that wartime policies,
time, and geography can affect the process of memorialization. The British nation viewed the
Western Front as the only theater of the war that truly mattered, 217 and memorialization efforts
elsewhere never received the level of care and consideration of those in France and Belgium. In
Mesopotamia, the wartime policy decision by the Commission not to turn over records of Indian
burials and missing to Graves Registration Units lead directly to the fragmented and inaccurate
state of those records during the memorialization process. A limited time for construction after a
troubled planning process made the correction of these records, scattered amongst Indian Army
units already returned to their home garrisons, impractical. Finally, the fact that Mesopotamia is
so distant from both Europe and India meant that very few relatives of the fallen could actually
visit the memorial. Without large numbers of visitors making the journey to view the memorial,
the Commission felt justified in abandoning efforts to include the names of India’s missing rank
and file on the memorial. This resulted in these missing soldiers being reduced to a statistic. No
longer individuals with their own unique experiences, they have instead become simply part of
the greater tragedy of the war.
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THE LEGACY OF INDIA’S MEMORIALS: A CONTINUED DIVERGENCE

“Each one that is born into this world must drink the cup of death, and all I ask of God is such a
death as will bring honour to my name in the world.” - Risaldar Sadik Muhammad Khan, 36th
Jacob’s Horse, France, 1917. 218

On April 6, 2003, the British 7th Armoured Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade began an
assault on the city of Basra during the 2003 United States lead invasion of Iraq. 219 By April 6 the
city was in British hands. Nearly 90 years after the British and Indian landings at Fao in the
opening months of the First World War, Britain once again opened an invasion of Iraq with an
assault on Basra. The men of the Indian Army, now serving an independent nation with no
remaining imperial ties to Britain, took no part in this assault. On November 9, 2003, nearly
eight months after the capture of Basra, British forces held a Remembrance Day service at the
Basra Memorial. Nearly 400 service members representing each British unit in Iraq attended the
ceremony and read aloud the names of the 53 British killed to that point in the campaign. This
ceremony marked the first British Remembrance Day service in Iraq since 1989 and the first at
the Basra Memorial since 1954. 220 Six years later, on April 30, 2009, the British held a ceremony
in Basra marking the end of their combat operations in Iraq. In those six years 179 British
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soldiers lost their lives. 221 Far from the nearly one million dead of the British Empire in the First
World War, the dead of the modern war in Iraq no longer warranted large-scale government
memorials and cemeteries. Instead, Britain repatriated its war dead home to their families for
private burials. No British soldiers went missing in action during the entire campaign.
The low intensity of modern warfare and the relatively limited number of casualties it
produced in Iraq no longer justified a nationalization of Britain’s war dead or their
memorialization in carefully planned cemeteries and memorials. This meant that the
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, having changed its name following the dissolution of
the British Empire, no longer played a central role in commemorating Britain’s war dead. In fact,
the Commission did not undertake any large scale memorialization or building projects following
the end of the Second World War. The dissolution of the British Empire and the shrinking scale
of the wars fought by Britain in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries rendered the
massive commemoration efforts of the Commission obsolete. Once again British war
memorialization returned to a private effort, conducted by families and small communities
independent of the government.
Although the Commission’s oversight of memorializing the war dead of the British
Empire lasted a mere 50 years, its efforts can only be viewed as a massive success. The
memorials and cemeteries it constructed following the First and Second World Wars still stand
as some of the most visible symbols of the cost of twentieth-century warfare. They also continue
to fulfil the Commission’s vision of a memorial to Empire. Although the British Empire no
longer exists, the soldiers from across the world who found their final resting place in the
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Commission’s cemeteries and memorials are forever unified in its memory. The ground these
sites occupy can be viewed as the last surviving territory of the Empire, paid for with the blood
of those soldiers who fought and died in its service. The Commission still oversees most of these
sites, carefully maintaining these grounds and the memories they represent.
For India’s dead of the First World War these sites represent a notion of Empire their
nation successfully strove to gain independence from. The independence movements led by such
notable Indians as Mahatma Gandhi continually gained momentum during both world wars until
India finally gained its independence in 1947 and became a republic in 1950. But during the First
World War at least, there existed a semblance of a unified British Empire coming together to
fight and win the largest European war to that point. The 1.3 million soldiers India sent to fight
overseas represented the single largest contribution of manpower to the Imperial war effort and
these soldiers served with distinction from the earliest days of the war until well after its end.
The most significant monuments to their service are found at Neuve Chapelle in France and at
Basra in Iraq.
The fates of these two memorials could not be more different. Today France is a nation
that has been at peace since the end of the Second World War, yet still scared by the two world
wars that raged through its cities and countryside. The First World War took the lives of over 1.4
million French soldiers and civilians and has become a central element of French national
identity. 222 The sites that commemorate the soldiers of all nations who fought to defend France
during that war, including those built by the IWGC, are viewed with reverence by the French
nation. The memorial at Neuve Chapelle is still maintained by the CWGC, its horticulture and

222

Guillaume Vandenbroucke “Fertility and Wars: The Case of World War I in France,”
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6, no. 2 (April 2014): 108-136.
101

structure carefully kept in pristine condition. Every year thousands of people visit the memorial
either to pay their respects or out of a fascination with the war and its significance. The memorial
also hosts numerous events commemorating the war, including a visit by Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi in April of 2015. It has also been updated over time and in 1964 the Commission
added to the monument the names of six Indian soldiers exhumed from the Sarrebourg French
Military Extension and cremated. 223 Still treated with the same care and reverence the
Commission put into its planning and construction, the memorial at Neuve Chapelle stands as a
fitting tribute to the sacrifices of those Indian soldiers who died on the Western Front and who
have no known grave.
In modern day Iraq, the Basra Memorial has suffered an unfortunate fate. The nation of
Iraq is still facing the consequences of the First World War to this day. Historians have noted the
direct connection between British led efforts to draw national borders in the Middle East
following the war and current day instability and conflict in the region. This instability and
conflict created a profound effect on the current condition of the Basra Memorial. Following the
collapse of the British Empire and the end of British influence in Iraq, the Basra Memorial was
left to the mercy of the Iraqi government and the local population. Despite this, the Iraqi
government under Saddam Hussein showed a great amount of respect to the memorial. When its
original site on the west bank of the Shatt-Al-Arab became threatened, the Iraqi government
moved the monument in 1997 to a more suitable location 32 kilometers west of Basra on the
road to Nasiriyah. The US led invasion of 2003, however, ended any kind of stability that existed
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in the country. Years of occupation and the later conflict against the Islamic State left the Iraqi
government with little resources to spend on maintaining war memorials and the Commission
itself has largely been denied access to its memorials and cemeteries in the country. Today, the
Commission simply waits until local conditions improve and it can return to Iraq and undertake
rehabilitation projects of its memorials and cemeteries. Until then, the temporary Basra
Memorial is contained in a two volume Roll of Honor containing the names of all those soldiers
commemorated on the memorial. Kept locked in a glass display case at the Commission’s
headquarters in Maidenhead, United Kingdom, these books are available to the public on request
through an archivist. These books also contain the names of every Indian soldier left off of the
memorial itself. 224 Though not inscribed in stone, the names and individual memories of these
soldiers have finally in some small way returned to their rightful place in the Commission’s
memorialization efforts of the Mesopotamian Campaign.
The memorials at Neuve Chapelle and Basra illustrate the profound effect geography and
official policy can have on the creation and fate of war memorials. In a war as large and
widespread as World War I graves registration and record keeping efforts diverged between
theaters and adapted to the local conditions. Near to Britain and the center of the entire war, the
Commission meticulously planned and executed these efforts on the Western Front. Thousands
of miles away and taking place in the middle of an expeditionary campaign, these efforts in
Mesopotamia remained unorganized and inefficient. The significance of this divergence in policy
for India’s war dead comes down to record keeping. The detailed and accurate records of India’s
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missing war dead in Europe enabled the Commission to memorialize all of these soldiers by
name on its memorials in France and Belgium. In Mesopotamia, working with fragmented and
inaccurate records, the Commission reduced these names to a statistic. With no known graves or
physical remains, the missing of war have only their names to act as their final monument.
Although the British government and the Commission put in every effort to give these missing
soldiers the monuments they deserved, they could not overcome the simple restriction of not
having the information needed to do so.
To look at the cemeteries and memorials built by the Imperial War Graves Commission
following the First World War is to view a physical expression of grief as well as a monument to
an Empire that no longer exists. The names recorded on the headstones and walls of these sites
each represent a unique individual with their own stories and their own tragic ends. The memory
of war is often one of victories and defeats, politics and strategy; but it is the dead of war who
represent the true tragedy of these conflicts. For India, the tragedy of the First World War is
represented by the 60,000 soldiers it sent overseas to fight for the British Empire who never
returned home. Those Indians who died on the Western Front have their names forever enshrined
in meticulously maintained cemeteries and on the walls of carefully planned memorials. For
those who died in the sands of Mesopotamia, the site of India’s greatest victories and defeats,
their memory exists in isolated graves and as a number on a crumbling monument, each slowly
being consumed by the desert and the continuing chaos of war.
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